POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
IP/CORE 400
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego
Fall 1999
Time: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 11:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m.
Location: Robinson Building Complex (IR/PS) Auditorium
Instructor: Matthew Shugart
OVERVIEW
The countries of the Pacific Rim are increasingly important to American business and foreign relations. The countries of the region are becoming major trading partners and, in some cases, competitors. Some are undergoing fundamental changes in how their governments are organized.
There is a great diversity in the cultures, languages, and government institutions among the countries of the Pacific. In this course, we depart from the format of the conventional "Comparative Governments" course, with its country-by-country, descriptive approach. Instead, we seek to develop a more general approach that can be used to study policymaking in a wide variety of national settings. This course teaches tools for analyzing the logic of how decisions are made, why decision makers choose the policies they choose and to whom they have to answer for the choices made.
The course is divided into three analytical modules. In the first, we study general principles of political organization and how the "principal–agent" theory, derived from management studies, elucidates how political systems work and how collective decisions are made. In the second, we apply these concepts to the variety of democratic institutions found in the Pacific region, including the United States, and with comparative reference to Europe. In the third, we look at the variety of authoritarian institutions and explore questions about the many countries of the world, especially the Pacific region, that are best thought of as transitional or semi-democracies.
REQUIREMENTS
There is one book to purchase: Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, 1999).
There is also set of readings to be purchased from University Reader Printing Service, which will be sending representatives to class at the beginning of the quarter. The reader contains all readings listed in this syllabus aside from Lijphart’s book.
All students are expected to come to each session having read and studied that day's assigned reading. Students are subject to being called "cold" at any time, and must be able to demonstrate orally an understanding of the issues raised in the reading.
Grading
The following are the components of your final grade and how they are weighted:
Take-home written case on economic reform in New Zealand, due October 26 15%
In-class short-answer midterm examination, November 11 35
Take-home short answers on policy variations, due November 23 10
Take-home short answers on authoritarian and transitional systems, due December 210
In-class short-answer final examination (date to be announced) 30
The written case will be based on a reading on economic reform in New Zealand that is included in your reader. No additional research is needed; the reading contains all the facts you need to write the case. The questions are also in your reader, and will ask you to apply concepts learned so far in this course to the case. Further guidelines appear in the reader.
The midterm and final examinations will be a series of questions on which you will be asked to write short answers (i.e. a paragraph or two). The midterm will be given during a regular class period. The final will be given during finals week on a date to be announced. It will be in a format that will allow you to apply the tools you have learned in the course; additional readings for the exam will be made available during the last week of the course.
The take-home short answers on the topics of policy variations and authoritarian/transitional systems will be brief (i.e. a few paragraphs) responses to questions that will have been handed out in class ahead of time.
No late assignments will be accepted and no make-up examinations will be offered without a University-approved and documented excuse. Acceptable excuses include illness, which must be documented by the University health service or your physician, or a death in the immediate family. It is very important that all students understand that no other excuses will be accepted aside from those recognized by standing University policy. Appropriate accommodations will be made for students with documented disabilities, consistent with University policies.
All grading in this course will be done by the instructor. There is a Student Assistant who is a second-year MPIA candidate, but he will do no grading. Because of the large size of this course and in an effort to provide as much feedback in the form of comments on written work as possible, there may be some delays in returning corrected work to students. Please understand! Every effort will be made to return your first case assignment by November 4, but if this proves not to be feasible, grading will be completed by November 9 at the latest, so that you will have them before the midterm.
Students are expected to participate in class discussions. Students' responses to cold calls will be tracked with the help of the Student Assistant. Those who perform exceptionally well or poorly will have their grades adjusted accordingly. Only cold calls, rather than volunteered comments, will be tracked in order to maintain equity among different personality types, cultural backgrounds, and degrees of comfort with the English language. If volunteered oral comments were tracked, too, students who are especially eager to speak would be unfairly advantaged over their quieter classmates. However, students are encouraged to volunteer pertinent remarks and ask clarifying or probing questions during class. Naturally, basic standards of courtesy, i.e. raising one's hand and waiting to be acknowledged, are expected of students.
SCHEDULE OF TOPICS, READINGS, AND WRITTEN CASES
September 30
1. Introduction
Reading: None.
I. A Framework for Understanding Political Organization
October 5
2. Collective Action
Reading: Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, pp 5-16, 33-36, 46-48, 132-135, 165-167.
Key questions: What is a public good, and why do they tend to be undersupplied? How do groups organize? What is the free-rider problem, and how can it be overcome? Why do some groups remain "latent"?
October 7
3. Delegation and the Question of Who Has Ultimate Authority
Reading: Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, Chapter 2.
Key questions: What are principals and agents? What problems does organizational structure solve? What problems does it create? How are the problems created by delegation mitigated within an organizational structure?
October 12
4. Majoritarian and Consensus Models of Democracy
Reading: Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, Chapters 1–3.
Key question: What are the majoritarian and consensus models, and how do they delegate differently the political authority of government?
October 14
5. Political Institutions and Delegation of Authority: Constitutional Structure
Reading: Matthew S.R. Palmer, "Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization:
Examining Ministerial Responsibility," and
Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe."
Key questions: Where does the cabinet dominance of majoritarian parliamentary come from; i.e., how can it be explained by looking at the question of who has ultimate authority? Is a presidential system majoritarian or consensual? What factors explain whether a parliamentary or presidential system is majoritarian or consensual?
October 19
6. Electoral Systems: Delegation from Voters to Legislators and from Legislators to Party Leaders
Reading: Lijphart, Chapter 8.
Key questions: How do proportional representation (PR) and plurality (or majoritarian) electoral systems operate? What are some political consequences of different types of electoral systems?
October 21
7. Public Administration: Delegation from Politicians to Bureaucrats
Reading: Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems."
Key questions: How, according to the authors, do bureaucratic structures differ in Britain and the United States? What is the logic of delegation that explains the different structures that we see in different forms of democratic systems? Why are bureaucrats given more "autonomy" in Britain and why does the American bureaucracy operate under such strict procedures?
II. Institutional Variations and Policy-Making in Democracies
October 26
8. Policymaking in a Parliamentary System: Economic Reform and Electoral Reform in New Zealand
Reading: Daniel Nielson, "The Politics of Economic Reform in New Zealand" (IR/PS case study).
Written case
October 28
9. Policymaking in a Parliamentary System: Elections and Electoral Reform in Japan
Reading: Mathew McCubbins and Frances Rosenbluth, "Party Provision for Personal Politics:
Dividing the Vote in Japan," from P.F. Cowhey and M.D. McCubbins, eds, Structure
and Policy in Japan and the United States, ch. 3.
Steven R. Reed and Michael F. Thies, “The Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan.”
Key questions: How was Liberal Democratic Party organized to provide for "personal politics"? Why did the LDP organize this way, given the electoral system? What were the consequences for policy? How might things change under the new electoral system?
November 2
10. Policymaking in a Presidential System: Trade Policy in the United States
Reading: Reading: I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, ch. 6 (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992).
Key questions: Why did the U.S. Congress delegate trade policy authority to the executive branch? What political problems did members of congress solve for themselves by delegating? What controls did congress, as principal, place on its agent in trade policy-making? Does this delegation make a difference in the policy that results?
November 4
11. Policymaking in a Presidential System: Examples from Argentina, Philippines, and Taiwan
Reading:
Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Democracy and Deficits in Taiwan: The Politics of
Fiscal Policy, 1986-1996."
Kent Eaton, "Political Obstacles to Decentalization in Argentina and the Philippines"
Key questions: Like Japan, Taiwan until recently used the single nontransferable vote to elect its legislature. Yet Taiwan is a presidential system, while Japan is parliamentary. What difference does this make? In what ways do the different electoral systems of these three presidential systems lead to differences in incentives and outcomes, compared with the United States?
November 9
12. First-half review and discussion
Reading: None
Brief presentation, followed by open forum for students to ask questions about material covered to this point in class and readings.
November 11
13. IN-CLASS MIDTERM EXAMINATION
November 16
14. Other Variations Among Democratic Systems
Reading: Lijphart, Chapters 9, 10, 12, 13.
Key questions: What is corporatism? Is it preferable to pluralism? What is the significance of federalism? Should legislation passed by elected representatives be subject to higher authority? What is central bank "independence" and is it desirable?
November 18
15. Consequences of Institutional Variation in Modern Democracies
Reading: Lijphart, Chapters 15, 16, and 17.
Key questions: Do you agree or disagree with Lijphart that consensus democracy is superior to majoritarian democracy? Do you accept the criteria by which he compares systems on their policy outputs?
November 23
16. Comparing Policy-Making in Three Advanced Industrial Democracies: Telecommunications
Reading: Roger G. Noll and Frances M. Rosenbluth, "Telecommunications Policy: Structure, Process, Outcomes."
November 25
Thanksgiving Holiday
III. Institutions in Authoritarian or Semi-Democratic Systems
November 30
17. Institutions and Delegation in Authoritarian Systems
Reading: Susan Shirk, "Reciprocal Accountability and Delegation by Consensus."
Key question: How does the logic of delegation work in authoritarian systems, and particularly in the Leninist system of China? What is reciprocal accountability, and how is it different from hierarchical accountability? Who are the principals in China, and who are the agents?
December 2
18. A Semi-Democratic System: Russia
Reading:
Robert G. Moser, “The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia. Post-Soviet
Affairs v13, n3 (July-Sep, 1997):284
“Russian Organized Crime: Crime without Punishment,” from the Economist.
December 7
19. A Democratic System in Crisis: Venezuela
Readings will be made available at a later date in order for this session on the evolving situation in Venezuela to be as current as possible.
December 9
20. Conclusion
Reading: None