COMPARATIVE POLITICS—INSTITUTIONS
Political Science 221
Winter, 2000
Professor Matthew Shugart Thursdays, 2:00–4:50 p.m.
Phone: 534-5016 Room: SSB 353
E-mail: mshugart@ucsd.edu
Office and hours: RBC 1311, Th., 9:00–11:00
This seminar is intended to assist students in preparing for the comprehensive examination in the field of comparative politics. In contrast with PS 220 (Comparative Politics: State and Society), this course covers subjects dealing with political institutions and organizations. It also serves as an introduction to a wide range of topics suitable for research in the field, with a focus on institutional themes such as constitutional design, party systems, legislatures, and single-party systems. It cannot exhaustively treat these vast topics, and some themes that might be placed under the rubric of "institutions" must necessarily be excluded or treated only tangentially. The intent is to provide students with an overview of several important topics.
This seminar is also distinct from IP/CORE 262 (Comparative Public Policy), in that it does not deal directly with explaining specific policy outcomes, how preferences of groups are articulated, or the design of regulatory and other implementing agencies. This seminar is organized around ten themes:
1. Introduction: Institutions, institutional analysis, and collective action
2. Types of constitutional systems: Unity and concentration vs. division and sharing of power
3. Parliamentary systems
4. Presidential systems
5. Electoral systems and party systems
6. Legislatures
7. Party organization and the electoral connection
8. The federal–unitary dimension (including judicial review, direct democracy, and constitutional
amendment procedures)
9. Bureaucracy and public policy
10. Authoritarian institutions and regime dynamics
Readings
For each session, there is a list of required readings. All students are expected to complete the required readings each week. There is also a list of recommended readings, which is provided for reference only. Students who are writing papers on any given topic are encouraged to tap the recommended list. All the books from which a substantial amount of reading is assigned have been ordered through the UCSD Bookstore and have been requested for placement on reserve at the IR/PS Library. Other readings will be made available by the instructor to a designated student each week, who will be responsible for taking orders from his or her fellow students for photocopying.
Requirements
All students taking the seminar for credit must come to class each session prepared to discuss any of the required readings. Students must participate actively in discussions, and may be called upon by the instructor at any time to answer questions. Each student must write three papers during the quarter. At least one of these must be based on a topic from the first five sessions, and at least one other must be based on a topic from sessions 6–10. These papers should be 750 to 1500 words long (typed, double-spaced) and should offer a critical review of the assigned readings. These papers should do more than simply summarize readings; they should take on a theme relevant to the topic of the week. They need not directly engage every required reading, but should deal with a substantial subset of them and be relevant to all of them. Possible topics for papers include, "Compare, contrast, and evaluate the principal approaches to the comparative study of subject X," or "The comparative study of X: some constructive suggestions," or related themes that otherwise synthesize and criticize the readings. Although each paper should deal primarily with the readings from one session, comparisons across sessions are welcome, too, as a secondary aspect of a paper. These papers are due no later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the class. Turn papers in to the instructor’s mailbox or office. Students may write more than three papers, in which case the grade will be based on the three best.
In addition to the three required papers, there will also be a final examination. This exam will be structured to mimic the institutions component of your comprehensive examination. More details will be provided at a later date.
Expectations of students who will be experiencing the course for a second time
Although this course is intended primarily as students' first extensive exposure to a systematic treatment of the comparative literature on institutions, students who have already taken the course often find it useful to sit through the course a second time while preparing for the comprehensive examination. These students are welcome, but are asked to observe some basic ground rules: (1) Allow first-time students to have the first opportunity to ask and respond to questions; (2) Participate in discussion only if you are also enrolled in at least a two-unit directed reading with the instructor based on this seminar; (3) If enrolled in a directed reading, consult with the instructors no later than the end of the first week of the quarter about what will be expected of you in terms of writing assignments.
1. Introduction: institutions, institutional analysis, and collective action
Required:
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), especially chapters 1 and 2, but skim chapters 5 and 6.
Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 5.
Symposium on “The Return to the State,” American Political Science Review 82, 3 (September 1988), 853-901.
Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: the Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6 (Special Issue, 1990): 213-53.
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1992, ch. 1.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Chs. 1-4, 14, 17.
Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Chapter 1.
Huber, John D., and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1994. "Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy," World Politics 46: 291–326.
Recommended:
Terry Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science 28: 739-777.
Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, ch. 4.
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1989. "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1:107-30.
G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982, chapters 1-2.
2. Types of Constitutional systems: unity and concentration vs. division and sharing of powers
Required:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 6-7.
Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, chapters 2-4.
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, especially chapters 2 and 3.
George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science 25: 289–325.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Political Structure and Economic Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes," forthcoming in Haggard and McCubbins.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Institutional Determinants of Policy: A Spatial Approach," forthcoming in Haggard and McCubbins.
Matthew S. R. Palmer, "Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, 1 (Apr., 1995): 164–188.
Recommended:
Birchfield, V; Crepaz, M., “The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies,” European Journal of Political Research 34, 2 (Oct., 1998):175-200.
Duverger, Maurice. 1980. "A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8:165-87.
Arend Lijphart, Presidential versus Parliamentary Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.
Albert Breton, “The Organization of Competition in Congressional and Parliamentary Governments.” In Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, eds., The Competitive State. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991.
Robert H. Dix, "Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia," Comparative Politics 12, 3 (April 1980): 303-21.
Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and its Dangers," European Journal of Political Science 3, 4 (1975): 477–505.
George Tsebelis, "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, 1 (1990): 5-29.
Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985.
3. PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
Required:
Gary Cox, The Efficient Secret. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, chapters 3–8.
Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, chs. 2-8.
Kaare Strøm, "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 17, 2 (July 1984): 229-64.
Michael J. Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science Review 84, 3 (September 1990): 873-90.
Recommended:
William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
Gregory M. Luebbert, "A Theory of Government Formation," Comparative Political Studies 17, 2 (July 1984): 229-64.
Lawrence Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, especially chapters 2-3, 10.
Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Leon D. Epstein, "What Happened to the British Party Model?", American Political Science Review 74, 3 (August 1984): 387-440.
Sven Groennings et al., eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Countries. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1970.
Abram De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, "Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-83," British Journal of Political Science 15, 2 (April 1985): 143-64.
Patrick Emmanuel, Governance and Democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean: An Introduction. Kingston, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 1993.
4. Presidential Systems
Required:
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, chapters by Linz and Sartori, and at least one other chapter.
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, Chapters 5-7, 9, 13 (skim 8).
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1 and 11 (one or more case studies recommended).
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, various case studies selected by student.
Donald Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, “Debate—Presidents vs. Parliaments,” Journal of Democracy 1, 4 (Fall 1990), 73-91.
Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, 1 (January, 1994).
Recommended:
John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 9.
Matthew S. Shugart, "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Government," American Political Science Review (June, 1995).
Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government. New York: Macmillan, 1992.
David Mayhew, Divided We Govern. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, 1 (1990): 157-79.
Thomas V. DiBacco, ed., Presidential Power in Latin American Politics. New York: Praeger, 1977.
Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.
James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992, revised second edition, especially chapters 1, 2, 4-6.
Donald L. Robinson, Reforming American Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.
Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., Separation of Powers--Does it Still Work? Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1986.
D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on the Appropriations Process," American Journal of Political Science 32 (August, 1988).
5. Electoral Systems and Party Systems
Required:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 5 and 8.
Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, especially chapters 8-17.
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley, 1954 (or any other edition), especially Book II, chapter 1.
Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, entire, but especially chapters 1-3; pp. 108-38; chapters 8, 10.
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 6.
Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology.”
Recommended
Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, chapters 10-11.
Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967 (second edition, 1971).
Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Ordeshook, Peter, and Olga Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties," American Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 100-23.
Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986, especially chapters by Duverger, Riker, and Sartori.
Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," International Organization 41, 2 (Spring 1987): 203-23.
Hans Daalder, "The Comparative Study of European Parties and Party Systems: An Overview," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983.
Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review 83, 3 (September 1989): 835-58.
Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science 34, 4 (November 1990): 903-35.
6. Legislatures
Required:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, ch. 11
George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, entire (but skim 6-8, appendices are optional).
Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, especially Introduction and chapters 4, 5, 9, and 10.
John Huber, "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in the United States and France," American Political Science Review 86, 3 (September 1992): 675-87.
Recommended:
Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991, especially chapters 1–3, and 7.
Philip Norton, ed., Legislatures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, especially chapters 7–8.
Mogens Pedersen, "Research on European Parliaments: A Review Article on Scholarly and Institutional Variety," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, 3 (August 1984): 505-29.
Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Richard D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting: Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory 12 (1976): 472-82.
Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Universalism and the Electoral Connection: A Test and Some Doubts"; Barry Weingast, "Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism"; and Bickers and Stein, "Response to Barry Weingasts' Reflections," Political Research Quarterly 47, 2 (1994): 295–333.
Weston Agor, Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence; Analyses for Nine Countries. New York: Praeger, 1971.
Joel Smith and Lloyd Musolf, eds., Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States. Durham: Duke University Press, 1979.
7. Party Organization and THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
Required:
Matthew S. Shugart, “’Extreme’ Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed-Member Alternative.”
Gary Cox, The Efficient Secret, chapters 9–13 (skim portions from p. 157 on).
Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, chapters 2-5.
Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1967, chapters 5 and 9 (8 also recommended).
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957, especially chapters 8 and 9.
David Mayhew, "The Electoral Connection and the Congress," in Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Kaare Strøm, "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties," American Journal of Political Science 34, 2: 565-98.
Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39, 2 (1995): 406-433.
Recommended:
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, introduction and chapters 8–9.
Richard S. Katz, "Intraparty Preference Voting," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986.
Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niou, "Seat Bonuses under The Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Comparative Politics 26, 2 (1994): 221-236.
Masaru Kohno, "Rational Foundations for the Organization Of The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan," World Politics 44, 3 (1992): 369-397.
Reed, S. R. 1990. “Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger’s Law to the Japanese Case,” British Journal of Political Science 20: 335-356.
Eric M. Uslaner, "Casework and Institutional Design: Redeeming Promises in the Promised Land, Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (1985): 35–52.
Scott Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 24 ,1 (1991): 21-43.
Michelle M. Taylor, "Formal Versus Informal Incentive Structures And Legislator Behavior: Evidence From Costa Rica," Journal of Politics 54 , 4 (1992 ): 1055-1073.
John M. Carey, Term Limits and Legislative Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Klaus Törnudd, The Electoral System of Finland. London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968.
B. Grofman, S. Lee, E. Winckler, and B. Woodall, eds. Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of An Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
8. THE FEDERAL–UNITARY DIMENSION (including judicial review, direct democracy, and constitutional amendment procedures)
Required:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 10, 12, 13 (and review pp. 213-15 and ch. 14)
William Riker, "Federalism," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, 5: 93-172.
Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, especially Introduction and chapters 2, 3, 5, 8, and 9.
Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, chapters 8–9.
Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88, 2 (June 1994).
Susanne Lohman, "Federalism and Central Bank Autonomy: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1952–1992," World Politics 50, 3 (Apr. 1998): 401+.
Recommended:
Arend Lijphart, "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links," Canadian Journal of Political Science 12, 3 (September 1979): 499-515.
Douglas Verney, "From Executive to Legislative Federalism? The Transformation of the Political System in Canada and India," Review of Politics 51, 2 (Spring 1989): 241-63.
Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 2 (Fall 1990).
Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
James L. Gibson, "From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior," Political Behavior 5 (1983): 7-49.
Walter F. Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter," Review of Politics 48, 3 (Summer 1986): 401-23.
David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978.
Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
Richard E. Johnston, The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal–State Relations in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1969.
Keith G. Bantig and Richard Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: The Experience of Eight Nations. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1988.
Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, second edition, 1992, especially chapters 1, 4, and 5.
Sylvia Maxfield, Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
9. bureaucracy and public policy
Required:
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 9, 15, 16.
Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration (Cambridge UP, 1995), chapters 1–5.
Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150/1 (1994): 171-95, and attached comments by Gebhard Kirchgässner and Arthur Lupia.
Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, chs. 6–7.
Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, chapter 6.
Ellen Immergut, "Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care," Journal of Public Policy 10, 4.
Steven Steinmo, "Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain," World Politics 41, 4 (1989): 500-535.
Recommended:
Robert Wade, "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better at Development," World Development 13, 4 (April 1985).
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms," in McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 2 (Fall 1987)
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), pp. 32-6, 78-96, 162-81.
John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6 (Special Issue 1990): 1-27.
Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Jonathan Bendor, "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 353-95.
Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens, "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State." American Journal of Sociology 99 (1993), 3:711-749.
Allen Schick, "Governments versus Budget Deficits," David Vogel, "Representing Diffuse Interests in Environmental Policymaking," and Helen Milner, "Managing International Commitments in Trade Policy" in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Brookings Institution, 1993).
Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, eds., Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies Of Telecommunications(Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially Chapter 1.
R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," and other chapters in Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?.
Sam Kernell, "The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy," in Kernell, ed., Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in the United States and Japan (Brookings Institution, 1991).
Steven Steinmo, "It's the Institutions, Stupid: Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America." Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law 20, 2 (1995):329-372.
Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Democracy and Deficits in Taiwan: The Politics of Fiscal Policy 1986-1996," and Lisa Baldez and John Carey, "Budget Procedure and Fiscal Restraint in Post-Transition Chile," forthcoming in Haggard and McCubbins.
Arend Lijphart and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages," British Journal of Political Science 21, 2 (1991): 235–56.
10. Authoritarian Institutions and regime dynamics
Required:
Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, especially chapters 1, 2, and 10.
Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, especially chs. 3-7, 14.
J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy (Cambridge University Press, 1995), chapters 2 and 3.
Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton University Press, 1988.
Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994).
Matthew S. Shugart, "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength And Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices," British Journal of Political Science, 1998.
J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation.
Recommended:
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New haven: Yale University Press, 1968, especially ch. 1.
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, chapter 1.
Michael Coppedge, “Parties and Society in Mexico and Venezuela: Why Competition Matters,” Comparative Politics (April 1993).
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, chapter 7.
Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton University Press, 1992).
Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government and 'Tutelary' Democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 35, 1 (Winter 1993).
Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Tun-jen Cheng, "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan," in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles : Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton University Press, 1990).
Arturo Valenzuela, "The Consolidation of One-Man Rule in Chile," in Paul Drake, ed., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990 (University of Nebraska Press, 1991).
Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (University of California Press, 1987), chapter 5.
Robert Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: a Concrete Review of the B-A Model," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton University Press, 1979).
Eduardo Silva, "Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 1973-1988," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993).
Tun-jen Cheng, "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan," in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles : Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton University Press, 1990).
Yun-han Chu. "State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries," International Organization 43 (Autumn 1989).