P.S. 215S: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
FALL 1998
Herbert Kitschelt
office hours: Wednesday 3:45 - 5:00 PM and by appointment
The seminar analyses the choice and the consequences of democratic institutions for modes of political interest intermediation, public policy-making, and regime stability. The subject matter of the course and the empirical evidence discussed are not confined to a particular region of the world. In fact, the course topic lends itself to cross-regional comparison. The course begins with three secessions considering theoretical and methodological aspects of institutional analysis. While there has been considerable research on the consequences of institutions, venturing into the study of the emergence of institutions still enters in part unchartered territory. Nevertheless, in light of the large number of democracies that have newly appeared over the past 25 years, accounting for the emergence of institutions is one of the research frontiers of comparative politics.
In its second and third part, the course deals at length with two institutions that profoundly affect the governance structures of democracy, electoral laws and legislative-executive relations. In the fourth part, we examine three further institutions more briefly, the internal structure of legislatures, federalism, and the role of Central Banks. The last two course sessions are devoted to students' presentations of research projects.
BASIC READINGS
There are a number of books to be purchased from the bookstore. Articles for the course will be available in hardcopies in the graduate student lounge and electronically in the library's electronic reserves. The basic books are:
Cox, Gary, Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Knight, Jack, Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Linz, Arturo and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Vol. 1. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994.
North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990.
Scharpf, Fritz, Games Real Actors Play. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989. (this book is now available only in hardback; purchase is recommended, but not required)
COURSE REQUIREMENTS
1. TWO written reports on institutional arrangements in individual countries. Each report is on a different institution, with three institutions to pick from (electoral laws, executive-legislative design, federalism/territorial division of jurisdictions). For each report, you choose a different country from lists provided at the end of the syllabus. You may be asked to give a brief oral report on your country's institution. Every course participant has to circulate her/his report by e-mail to the other course participants no later than on the Tuesday, 5 pm, preceding the day of the course session in which we will discuss the materials you cover in your comment.
Each report: 10% of the course grade.
2. Written comments on the course readings for two seminar sessions, with weeks 5 and 6 and 8 through 12 eligible for choice. Circulate your comments by e-mail to all course participants no later than on the Tuesday, 5 pm, preceding the day of the course session in which we will discuss the materials you cover in your comment. On one occasion you write a comment, you may be asked to lead the seminar discussion (two course participants can do this jointly).
Each comment: 10% of the course grade.
3. A research paper in which you compare the choice, attempted reform or implemented revision of one democratic institution (choose from: electoral laws, executive-legislative design, territorial jurisdictions, Central Banks) in at least two countries. Please discuss your choice of topic with the course instructor. Undergraduate papers should be in the neighborhood of 15 pages, graduate students choose between writing minor or major research papers. Some oral presentations of preliminary research results will be scheduled for the final two class session of the semester. Final papers must be submitted no later than December 17, 1998. Course paper: 50% of the grade.
4. Regular class attendance is expected. Class participation: 10% of the grade.
PART I: METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES
WEEK 1: Basic Concepts -- Institutions and Democracy (September 2)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, pp. 3-69
Sue E.S. Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, "A Grammar of Institutions," American Political Science Review, 89 (1995) 3:
582-600.
David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy 'With Adjectives.' Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,"
World Politics, 49 (1997) 3: 130-51.
Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory," pp. 103-32 in Jon Elster and Aanund
Hylland, eds. Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
James Gardner March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American
Political Science Review, 78 (1984) 3: 734-49.
FURTHER READINGS:
David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds., The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
David Held, Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Stephen Holmes, "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy," pp. 195-240 in: Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds.,
Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Terry Moe, "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7 (1991): 106-29.
William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman, 1982.
Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper 1946.
WEEK 2: The Logic of Institutional Analysis (September 9)
REQUIRED READING:
Scharpf, Games Real Actors Can Play. entire
FURTHER READINGS:
Trainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Jon Elster, The Cement of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller, Social Norms and Economic Institutions. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1991.
David Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Kenneth Shepsle, "Studying Institutions. Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical
Politics, 1 (1989) 2: 131-47.
Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective," pp. 1-32 in Steinmo and
Thelen, Structuring Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
George Tsebelis, Nested Games. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.
Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985.
WEEK 3: The Emergence of Institutions: Design and Evolution (September 16)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, entire
North, Institutions,... pp. 73-140
FURTHER READINGS:
Lee J. Alston, Trainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
Robert Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society, 16 (1988):
387-401.
John N. Drobak and John V.C. Nye, eds., The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. London: Academic Press
1997.
Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting and Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional
Design in Post-communist societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Robert Goodin, ed., The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler, eds., Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance, and
Effects. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.
Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Margret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Margret Levi, "A Logic of Institutional Change," pp. 403-18 in: Karen Schwers Cook and Margret Levi, eds., The Limits
of Rationality. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1990. (see also the articles by Michael Taylor (222-239) and Russell Hardin (358-77) in the same volume.
Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton, 1981.
Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981.
Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," pp. 89-132 in William James Booth,
Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, Politics and Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
PART II: ELECTORAL LAWS
WEEK 4: The Variety of Electoral Laws (September 23)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Cox, Making Votes Count, introduction (3-12), CHAPTER 3 (37-68), and browse through Appendix A (279-302).
Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapter 3 (19-37)
FURTHER READINGS:
André Blais and Louis Massicotte, "Electoral Systems," pp. 49-82 in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa
Norris, eds., Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996.
Mark P. Jones, "Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas," Electoral Studies, 14 (1995): 5-21.
Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994. appendices pp. 153-78.
Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Alamanac of Electoral History. Third edition. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1991.
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 1-2.
WEEK 5: The Impact of Electoral Laws (September 30)
REQUIRED READINGS:
John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral
Formulas," Electoral Studies, 14 (1995) 4: 417-39.
Cox, Making Votes Count, chapters 2 (13-33), chapters 4 through 11 (69-224) and skim chapters 12 through 14 (225-65).
Mikhail G. Filippov and Olga V. Shvetsova, Political Institutions and Party Systems in New Democracies of Eastern
Europe. Paper delivered at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 8/30 - 9/3.
Arend Lijphart, "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85," American Political Science Review, 84 (1990):
481-96.
Robert G. Moser, The Impact of Electoral Systems on New Democracies: The Russian Case in Comparative Perspective,"
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1997.
Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapters 7 through 13 67-155
FURTHER READINGS:
Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science,
39 (1995) 2: 406-33.
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley, 1954.
Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986.
Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review,
83 (1989): 835-58.
Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1995.
Richard Katz, A Theory of Party and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989-91," Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 4 (1992): 207-23.
Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994.
Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives. New York: Praeger,
1985.
Scott Mainwaring, "Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective," Comparative
Politics, 24 (1991): 21-43.
Robert G. Moser, "The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, 13 (1997) 3: 284-302.
Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
Steven R. Reed, "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case," British Journal of Political
Science, 29 (1991): 335-56.
William H. Riker, "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," American
Political Science Review, 76 (1982): 753-66.
Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation, and Competition in Western Democracies," PP. 307-40
in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., Western European Party Systems. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage, 1983.
Giovanni Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method," pp. 43-68 in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986.
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 3.
WEEK 6: The Choice and Reform of Electoral Laws (October 7)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Carles Boix, Choosing Electoral Rules. Structural Factors or Political Calculations? Fourth version. Ohio State University,
April 1998.
Dieter Nohlen, "Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America," pp. 43-58 in: Arend Lijphart and Carlos H.
Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies. Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1996.
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 79-88.
Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," International Organization, 41 (1987) 2: 203-23.
Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapter 18, pp. 218-37.
Rein Taagepera, The Tailor of Marrakesh: Western Electoral Systems Advice to Emerging Democracies. UC Irvine 1997.
downloaded from http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/democ/papers/rein.htm
FURTHER READINGS:
Kathleen Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome," American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37 (1993): 965-89.
A. M. Carstairs, A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe. London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.
David Chapman, Can Civil Wars Be Avoided? Electoral and Constitutional Models for Ethnically Divided Countries.
London: The Institute for Social Inventions, 1991.
Designing Electoral Regimes, special issue of East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 3 (Spring 1994), No. 2. (with
inventory of electoral law provisions, 65-77.
Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. pp. 136-57.
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction,"
pp. 1-64 in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967.
Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith, "Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System:
The Russian Parliamentary Election Law," American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996) 4: 1253-79.
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 4.
PART III: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS
WEEK 7: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism (October 14)
REQUIRED READINGS:
John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?" pp. 1-29 in Carey and
Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Thomas Baylis, "Presidents versus Prime Ministers. Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," World Politics,
48 (1996) 3: 297-323.
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 1-27, 76-166
FURTHER READINGS:
John M. Carey, Octavio Amorim Neto, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in
Latin America," pp. 440-460 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
John M. Carey and Matthew Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Reports, Vol. 2
(1994) 41: 23-31.
The Postcommunist Presidency. special issue of East European Constitutional Review, Fall 1993-winter 1994 (with
inventory of the powers of post-communist presidents, pp. 82-94).
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 5-7.
WEEK 8: The Impact of Executive-Legislative Design (October 21)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Linz and Valenzuela, eds. The Failure of Presidential Democracy, contributions by Linz (3-87), Lijphart (91-105), Sartori
(106-18) and Stepan and Skach (119-36).
Donald Horowitz, Lipset, Linz, and Riggs, debates on presidentialism, pp. 203-22 in: Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary
versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Juan J. Linz, "Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe," pp. 1-15 in Raymond Taras,
ed., Post-Communist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Peter C. Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy, 6 (1995): 46-60.
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 28-75, 154-58, 166-272.
FOR THOSE WITH UNLIMITED TENACITY:
Copies of Mainwaring/Shugart 1997 and Shugart/Mainwaring 1997, listed below among further readings, are also available in the course readings. Both texts are highly recommended.
FURTHER READINGS:
Joel Hellman, "Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transition," East European Constitutional
Review, Vol. 5 (Winter 1996): 46-56.
Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, Parties and Their Environment. New York: Longman, 1982.
Mark Jones, "Presidential Election Laws and Multipartism in Latin America," Political Research Quarterly, 47 (1994):
41-57.
Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy. The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political
Studies, 26 (1993) 2: 198-228.
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System," pp. 394-439 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994: 171-95.
Timothy J. Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World,"
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39 (1997) 2: 123-55.
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapters 11 and
12.
Matthew Soberg Shugart, "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government," American
Political Science Review, 89 (1995): 327-43.
Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms
of the Debate," pp. 12-54 in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy
in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Raymond Taras, ed., Post-Communist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
WEEK 9: The Choice and Alteration of Executive-Legislative Design (October 28)
REQUIRED READINGS:
John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Institutional Design and Executive Decree," pp. 274-297, in Carey and
Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism. Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics,
49 (1997) 2: 184-211.
Jon Elster, "Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies," pp. 225-37 in Raymond Taras, ed., Post-Communist
Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies, 30 (1997)
3: 523-553.
Barbara Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies,
28 (1995): 239-74.
Matthew Soberg Shugart, "The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of
Politicians' Constitutional Choices," British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998) 1: 1-29.
FURTHER READINGS:
Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, eds., Post-Communist Transformation in Eastern Europe. special issue of
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 1995.
Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in New Democracies. Eastern Europe and Latin
America. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press, 1994. chapter 10.
PART IV: FURTHER DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
WEEK 10: Legislative Structure (November 4)
REQUIRED READINGS:
John D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament. Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996. chapters 2 (38-63), 4 (82-111) and 5 (112-37).
Kenneth Shepsle, "The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions. An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Models,"
Public Choice, 50 (1986): 135-78.
Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 70-73.
George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, introduction (1-9)
and implications (209-28).
Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress: Or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms,
are not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988): 132-63.
FURTHER READINGS:
Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds., Comparing Legislatures. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
The Constitution of Parliament. special section on parliamentary governance in East European Constitutional Review, Vol.
4 (Spring 1995), 56-89.
David M. Olson, The Legislative Process. A Comparative Approach. New York: Harper 1980.
Ezra Suleiman (ed.), Parliaments and Parliamentarians in Democratic Politics. London: Holmes and Meier 1986.
WEEK 11: Federalism (November 11)
REQUIRED READINGS:
Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., Comparative Federalism and Federation. Competing Traditions and Future
Directions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. (articles by Burgess, pp. 3-14, Gagnon, pp. 15-44, King pp. 94-101 and Burgess, 102-14)
Robert P. Iman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "The Political Economy of Federalism," pp. 73-105 in: Dennis C. Mueller, ed.,
Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Arend Lijphart, "Division of Power. The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts," chapters 6 (90-105)
and 10 (169-80) of Lijpart, Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
William Riker, Federalism. Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown 1964. 11-48, browse through 87-136.
Fritz Scharpf, "The Joint Decision Trap. Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration," Public
Administration, 66 (1988): 239-78.
George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25 (1995) 3: 289-325.
Barry R. Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic
Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11 (1995) 1: 1-31.
skim:
Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1987. browse through chapters 1
(1-33), 4 (115-53) and 7 (223-63).
FURTHER READINGS:
Albert Breton and Anthony Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1978.
Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977, esp. 41-47, 55-71 and 87-99.
Fritz Scharpf, Bernd Reissert and Fritz Schnabel, Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus.
Freiberg: Scriptor, 1976.
Fritz Scharpf, "Federal Arrangements and Multi-party Systems," Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 (1995):
27-39.
James Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
WEEK 12: Central Banks (November 18)
REQUIRED READINGS:
William T. Bernhard, "A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence," American Political Science
Review, 92 (1998) 2: 311-28.
John B. Goodman, "The Politics of Central Bank Independence." Comparative Politics, 23 (1991) 3: 329-49.
Torben Iversen, "Wage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence for Organized Market
Economies," British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998) 1: 31-61.
Sylvia Maxfield, "Financial Incentives and Central Bank Autority in Industrializing Nations," World Politics 46 (1994) 4:
556-88.
FURTHER READINGS:
Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, "Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative
Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 265 (1993) 2: 151-62.
Delia Boylan, Defusing Democracy. Central Bank Autonomy and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Ph.D. thesis,
Stanford University, December 1996.
Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993.
John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992.
Peter Hall, Governing the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peter Hall and Robert Franzese, "Mixed Signals. Central Bank Independence, coordinated Wage-Bargaining, and European Monetary Union, International Organization, 52 (1998) 2.
Torben Iversen, "Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money," International
Organization, 52 (1998) 2: 469-505
Sylvia Maxfield, Gatekeepers of Growth. The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
The Precarious Independence of Central Banks, special issue of East European Constitutional Review,
Vol. 3 (Summer and Fall 1994).
Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991.
John T. Woolley, Monetary Politics. The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
PART V: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH PAPERS
Session 13: November 30
Session 14: December 7
LIST OF INSTITUTIONS AND COUNTRIES FOR THE DESCRIPTION
(Countries were chosen based on the complexity and uniqueness of their institutional designs. If you want to take different countries, please discuss this with the instructor.)
A. ELECTORAL LAWS
*Australia *Germany *Japan (pre and post 94) *Russia
Belgium *Hungary *Mexico Spain
*Brazil *Ireland New Zealand (pre and post 94) *Uruguay
Colombia Israel Philippines
*France Italy (pre and post 94) *Poland
B. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
Argentina *Colombia Germany *Russia
Austria Czech Republic Israel Slovakia
*Brazil *Finland *Mexico USA
*Chile *France *Poland *Venezuela
C. DIVISION OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS
Argentina *Brazil *Germany Russia
Australia Canada India *Switzerland
*Belgium *Czechoslovakia (-92) *Mexico *USA