Tables and Figures

 

Table 1

Lack of Coordination in Presidential Races

 

PRI

 

(% Vote Share)

First Loser

 

(% Vote Share) *

Second Loser

(% Vote Share) **

Effective number of parties

***

SF Ratio

1964

87.77

11.04

0.68

1.28

0.06

1970

85.09

13.83

0.86

1.30

0.06

1976

87.84

3.69

1.97

1.13

0.53

1982

68.43

15.68

3.48

1.84

0.22

1988

50.71

30.59

16.79

2.61

0.55

1994

48.77

25.94

16.6

2.83

0.64

* First loser is the PAN candidate in most years, except 1976 when it did not field a candidate and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) was the first loser, and 1988 when the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) nominated Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as a common candidate.

** Second loser is the PPS in 1964 and 1970, the PARM in 1976, the Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM) in 1982, the PAN in 1988 and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) in 1994.

*** Calculated with effective vote, which discards invalid votes and those cast for unregistered candidates. In 1988 the index is calculated for the FDN coalition counted as a single party.

Source: Own calculations from data in Gómez Tagle (1997) cuadro 4.

 

Table 2

Institutional Change in Mexico. Rules for Representation.

 

 

1960

Changes

1999

Chamber of Deputies

178 single member districts.

A.   Party deputies (1963). Besides single member district deputies, legal 2.5% threshold to receive at least 5 deputies. One more deputy for each 0.5% of vote, to a maximum of 20. No party deputies for parties winning more than 20 single member districts. In practice, allocation of party deputies according to government discretion.

B.    Lower threshold (1972). Reduced to 1.5%, to validate PARM and PPS party deputies previously granted in spite of being below threshold.

C.    Drawing of 300 single member districts and introduction of closed list plurinominales (1977). Relatively homogeneous districts drawn according to 1970 census data. Party seats changed into 100 compensatory seats, distributed with a relatively proportional rule only to parties winning less than 60 single member districts. 

D.   Increase of plurinominal seats but elimination of compensatory feature (1986). Plurinominal seats are increased to 200. They are no longer compensatory seats, but allocated to any party with more than 1.5% but less than 51% of the vote. Upper bound of 350 deputies to majority party. “Gobernability clause” assures absolute majority if under 51% of the vote.

E.    Change of formula (1989). If no party above 35% of the vote, plurinominal deputies used as compensatory seats to ensure perfect proportional representation. Between 35% and 60%, absolute majority assured through those seats. Between 60% and 70%, equal seat vote ratio to majority party.

F.    Change of formula (1993). Inconsistencies of previous formula are eliminated, plurinominal seats allocated in a relatively proportional manner, independent of single member district results. Easier access to new parties through conditioned registry.

G.    Reform to campaign finance and access to media (1996). Increase of threshold to 2%.

 

300 single member districts. 200 multimember seats divided into 5 regional districts. 2% Threshold.

Senate

64 senators, two member formula for each state and the Federal District.

A.   Renewal of chamber by halves (1986). Half of the senators elected in midterm elections, eliminating the two member formula.

B.    Doubling size of chamber and introduction of first minority senator (1993). Elimination of staggered Senate election. Trinomial formula with only one vote cast, and one senator to the first minority.

C.    Introduction of principle of proportional representation (1996). Return to binomial formula, plus first minority. 32 Senators by principle of proportional representation.

Two member formulas for each state and the DF. First minority senators to the candidate heading the first losing party list. 32 PR senators in nationwide district.

 

Table 2 (continued)

Institutional Change in Mexico. Rules for Representation.

 

 

1960

Changes

1999

Governors

Direct election. Staggered from federal.

No change.

Direct election. Staggered from federal.

Municipal government

Council headed by  president from majority party.

A.   Introduction of proportional representation in municipal council (1977). PR principle for municipalities with more than 300,000 inhabitants.

B.    Proportional representation in all municipal councils (1983). State legislation will determine the specific form it takes.

 

Council headed president from majority party, PR council members.

Common presidential candidate

Cross-endorsement allowed.

Endorsement of presidential candidate from other party allowed only if common candidacies are presented for all concurrent races (i.e. 128 senators, 500 deputies), common campaign platform is presented and campaign finance is granted in proportion to largest coalition partner.

Cross-endorsement requires a coalition for all races.

 

Source: own compilation drawing from Gómez Tagle (1997); Molinar (1991); Lujambio (1995); Constitución  Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Comentada (1990) Mexico: UNAM; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/cnsinfo/fed00.htm); Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales (1996) México: Instituto Federal Electoral; and Ordenamientos Electorales (1994) México: Tribunal Federal Electoral.

 

 

 

Table 3

Gubernatorial Elections in Mexico 1993-1999.

State

Year

PRI

PAN

PRD

NP

Coalition

victory

previous

SF Ratio

Coahuila

1993

65.50%

27.00%

0.00%

1.97

 

PRI

PRI

0.0370

Chiapas

1994

50.40%

9.20%

34.90%

2.58

 

PRI

PRI

0.2636

Morelos

1994

75.80%

7.90%

0.00%

1.65

 

PRI

PRI

0.1265

Tabasco

1994

57.50%

2.60%

38.70%

2.08

 

PRI

PRI

0.0672

Baja Calif.

1995

42.30%

50.90%

3.30%

2.27

 

PAN

PAN

0.0309

Guanajuato

1995

32.90%

58.10%

7.00%

2.22

 

PAN

PAN

0.2134

Jalisco

1995

36.60%

51.90%

3.90%

2.45

 

PAN

PRI

0.1568

Yucatán

1995

48.70%

44.40%

3.00%

2.29

 

PRI

PRI

0.0868

Michoacán

1995

38.90%

25.50%

32.40%

3.11

 

PRI

PRI

0.7869

Campeche

1997

48.00%

3.10%

41.20%

2.46

 

PRI

PRI

0.1679

Colima

1997

42.60%

38.20%

16.30%

2.82

 

PRI

PRI

0.4263

Distrito Fed.

1997

25.60%

15.60%

48.10%

3.06

 

PRD

PRI

0.6085

Nuevo León

1997

41.90%

48.50%

3.20%

2.41

PRD+PVEM

PAN

PRI

0.0751

Querétaro

1997

39.50%

45.40%

7.40%

2.71

 

PAN

PRI

0.1834

S. L. Potosí

1997

49.50%

41.40%

9.10%

2.36

 

PRI

PRI

0.3236

Sonora

1997

41.80%

31.60%

23.50%

3.03

 

PRI

PRI

0.7181

Chihuahua

1998

50.30%

42.20%

5.50%

2.3

PT+CDP

PRI

PAN

0.1298

Zacatecas

1998

39.80%

13.50%

46.70%

2.53

 

PRD

PRI

0.3377

Durango

1998

39.90%

30.30%

8.40%

3.29

 

PRI

PRI

0.7027

Veracruz

1998

49.00%

27.20%

17.90%

2.88

 

PRI

PRI

0.6589

Aguascalie.

1998

38.00%

53.10%

6.90%

2.31

 

PAN

PRI

0.1800

Oaxaca

1998

48.90%

10.20%

37.60%

2.56

 

PRI

PRI

0.2720

Tamaulipas

1998

54.90%

26.60%

16.10%

2.51

 

PRI

PRI

0.6033

Puebla

1998

55.50%

29.70%

11.20%

2.44

 

PRI

PRI

0.3760

Sinaloa

1998

47.50%

32.70%

18.10%

2.73

 

PRI

PRI

0.5392

Tlaxcala

1998

44.30%

8.60%

34.00%

2.38

PRD+PT+

PVEM

Coali-

tion

PRI

0.2764

B. Calif. Sur

1999

37.40%

6.30%

55.90%

2.19

 

PRD

PRI

0.1672

Hidalgo

1999

53.50%

32.10%

14.40%

2.44

 

PRI

PRI

0.4491

Q. Roo

1999

44.40%

17.40%

36.10%

2.79

 

PRI

PRI

0.4807

Guerrero

1999

49.80%

1.70%

47.70%

2.1

PRI+PRS and PRD+PT+PRT

PRI

PRI

0.0334

Nayarit

1999

44.80%

52.90%

0.00%

2.08

PRD+PT+PVEM

Coali-tion

PRI

0.0189

Estado de México

1999

42.50%

35.50%

22.00%

2.82

 PAN+PVEM and PRD+PT 

PRI

PRI

0.6208

Source: Own calculations from data collected and assembled by CIDAC, Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo, A.C. drawing from official results given by state electoral commissions.

 

Table 4

Coordination in Gubernatorial Races, by Winning Party (1995-1999).

 

Number

Percent

SF Ratio

Margin

N

NP Molinar

PRI

17

60.7%

0.4339

11.6

2.68

2.11

Hegemonic

2

7.1%

0.4897

27.1

2.48

1.61

Not Hegemonic

15

53.6%

0.4264

9.6

2.71

2.18

PAN

6

21.4%

0.1400

13.0

2.34

1.87

PRD

3

10.7%

0.3712

15.9

2.69

1.93

COALITION

2

7.1%

0.1382

11.7

2.53

1.99

TOTAL

28

100.0%

0.3431

12.4

2.60

2.03

Source: Own calculations from CIDAC database of governor election results from the State Electoral Institutes.

* hegemonic is defined as where the PRI wins by a margin of more than 25% of the vote.

Table 5

Coordination in Municipal Races, by Winning Party (1993-1995)

Party

Number

Percent

SF Ratio

Margin

N

NP Molinar

PRI

1541

64.1

0.2563

0.5986

1.99

1.53

Hegemonic *

863

35.9

0.3019

0.9735

1.74

1.22

Not hegemonic

678

28.2

0.1982

0.1211

2.32

1.92

PAN

211

8.8

0.1792

0.1325

2.25

1.92

PRD