International Dimensions of The Democratic Ferment in Africa: An Insider’s View    

 

By Kayode Soremekun

 

 

 

The order of the day was hustle. Let’s have the roof post haste. Run up a few slender constitutional posts to support it

  And hope for the best, said the colonial office. The walls can be done properly later-perhaps. At all costs pacify American prejudices so clearly shown in Yalta and never mind the consequences    Ian Brook in: The One Eyed Man is King [1]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Democracy and its concomitant essence have continued to be the prime issues in contemporary scholarship. A cursory survey of the intellectual scene reveals that rare is the scholar who does not have something to say about democracy. Meanwhile its ethical strain is such that it is almost impossible to mount any offensive against democracy. Indeed those who attempt to oppose democracy usually do so in the name of democracy. As we will go on to see in this discussion this is invariably one of the main drawbacks of the democratic ferment in the world.[2]

 

Our task in this particular essay is not as broad however. Rather the aim is to examine largely from an insider’s perspective he nature and profile of the international forces that are seeking to consummate the democratic ideal in Africa. As can be seen from the title since there is an emphasis on the international perspective it will be in place an explanation as to why an insider’s   perspective is being offered. As an individual who lives the day-to-day reality of the African condition or non-condition I believe that I am well placed to offer a perspective that might be somewhat different from those of the participants at this conference. My insider’s status is also partly based on the fact in the past five years I have had to engage in a measure of activism and to this I have in the process acquired a measure of extra-text book experience on the issues how external forces are seeking to shape the democratic momentum in Africa.[3] At this point in time it is also necessary to dwell if only briefly on a major limitation which attends this exercise. For obvious reasons it is impossible to effect a detailed analysis of every democratic experience in Africa. Consequently our approach will be largely eclectic. It is an eclectism, which will combine broad generalizations with specifics, which will largely target social formations like Nigeria and Kenya.[4]   The overall intention is to ensure a comprehensive insight into the various external forces that are seeking to influence the democratic momentum in Africa. It is against this background that the paper is divided into four parts. Initialy we will effect a brief focus on the African State with a view to determining its resilience in relation to the external forces that are seeking to democratize the continent. Secondly we will examine the nature of these forces and subsequently we will go on to observe how these forces are being played out in various places like: Nigeria and Kenya. The paper will be rounded up with a conclusion, which will seek among other things to reflect on how the democratic agendum can be advanced in the light of contradictions, regression and other competing agenda.

 

A great deal theorizing has been effected on the African State. Such theorizing have given rise to various appellations like prebendal, sultanic, praetorian, and overdeveloped. This is hardly the place to indulge in an extensive elaboration of these various notions. This much is clear however, each of the fore mentioned epithets only capture to some extent the nature and profile of the African State. And perhaps the only drawback, which they appear to have, is that they are too neat to capture in a realistic and accurate way the rather complex political animal that is the African State. Indeed most of these categorizations do not reflect meaningfully on the relative ability of the African State in relation to external forces.[5] As we will go on to see particularly in the context of democratization, it is this relative autonomy, which partly explains why the African State is an ideal playground for the various interests and forces that are seeking to ensure democratization in Africa. Even then much of the immediate foregoing is very simplistic. It is simplistic to the extent that, that there is the presumption that all the forces which profess a commitment to democratization are really willing to live up to the responsibility of same. Moreover the image of the laid –back African State responding in a passive way to external forces is strictly speaking an inaccurate one. The situation is much more nuanced. Even among external forces a close scrutiny will reveal contradictions, which can be very puzzling. At the risk of jumping ahead of our analysis, it will be instructive to draw attention to a random instance like Germany. In Nigeria the accredited agents of the German State i.e. the German embassy remains largely aloof from the issues of democracy and democratization. By contrast the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a German NGO that is being funded by the German State is very involved in the issues of democratization in Nigeria.[6] The perplexity becomes deepened by the fact that in Kenya particularly during the testy face-off between Ambassador Smith Hempstone and Arap Moi, the German ambassador in Nairobi stood visibly beside the American ambassador. This incongruity is best explained by the nature of the shifting and evolving national interests as well as psychological variables such that, what one sees as in the case of Germany and other western countries like: Washington, Paris and Whitehall are hard nosed instances of realistic pursuits of national interests that are grounded in policy priorities and imperatives.   The foregoing situation, which can do with a measure of generalization, can be quite sobering, particularly for the analyst, who pursues studies in democracy and democratization with a didactic and moralistic bent.

 

Again it should be realized that it is not just the overt exposure of the African state that makes it an ideal playground for the external forces of democratization. The Middle East for instance is as over-exposed to the Western world. In this respect it is apposite to point out that although the Middle East is littered with various forms of monarchies and democratic regimes, the West is not as insistent on democratization as it appears to be doing in the African continent. Apparently the resource profiles of the two regions are of such contrasting magnitudes that they go a long way to explain the respective and varied attitudes of the external forces to the issues of democratization in the two regions. At this juncture it is appropriate to dwell if only briefly on the nature of these forces. They, i.e. the forces range from Western countries like the United States, France and Britain through Scandinavian countries to international organizations like The Unite Nations, The Commonwealth, The Organization of American States, The Catholic Church and the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS).[7] The inclusion of ECOWAS would appear to be very surprising since most of its leadership is composed of despots. Again this illustrates as we will go on to see the complex game of democracy and the inherent phenomenon of reciprocity which lies at the heart of international relations even when such relations are between relatively weak African States and the hegemonic forces in the international system.

 

Perhaps the most important factor which has given rise to the seemingly worldwide clamor for democracy is the recession of the power play between the former Soviet Union on one hand and the United States on the other. However this recession has merely served to uncover the deep and deepening conflict, which continue to grip the African continent. This is because while the cold war was mainly between the two super powers its cessation this did not mean the automatic ends of conflicts or dictatorship in Africa. Indeed most of the enduring despots in the continent have tended to lay the charges of churlishness at the feet of status-quo powers in international relations contending that, having supported these powers in the struggle against communism, they do not expect to be paid in ways which tend to suggest that their demise might be in the offing, courtesy of democratization as engineered by these self-same powers. Invariably such accusations have sometimes succeeded in twitching the consciences of the status-quo powers such that on some occasions they have been less than forthright in the cause of their democratization efforts in Africa. When this scenario is complemented with the attitudes of the old and persisting guards in the foreign offices of Washington, Paris and London, one can easily appreciate why democracy promotion continues to be a treacherous minefield. Even then, it is even possible to contend that as contradictory as it might seem, the major powers do not hesitate to attend this high-minded ideal with the business as usual dose of real-politique. Peter Schraeder, [8] reveals for instance that,  the democratic venture, as novel as it seems, still has to cater to old trends as revealed in the persisting antipathies between Paris-Washington  relationships even when these two powers are busy pursuing the cause of democracy. According to him it is not uncommon to find a situation in which while Paris might be promoting democracy in one country, Washington could be seen neutralizing the process in the same country. And for good measure the reverse situation holds. In other words France can be found playing the same game on Washington. However in spite of these nuances and caveats on the various democratization projects in Africa, the recession of the power-play between the two super powers fostered a new climate of perspectives and attitudes which provided a more conducive environment to democratization. It was in part this seemingly conducive environment, which impelled the United Nations to accord a more practical vent to the basic rights of persons. At the same time the global body has since followed this up with a declaration on the rights of minorities. Meanwhile in Europe, a similar trend could be discerned. For instance the conference on Security and Cooperation in Eastern Europe spoke clearly to the need for political pluralism and openness. The organization followed this up with the Charter of Paris, which declared that the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of the Universal human rights. More significantly perhaps, the CSCE has since gone ahead to link minority protection to constitutional democracy and in the process has attempted to jettison subsisting norms in international relations by calling for the elimination of non-interference principles. Beyond pious declarations the CSCE has attempted to accord institutional teeth to its new attitude towards democratization. This can be observed in the fact that the Charter of Paris established a permanent office in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna and an office for Free Elections in Warsaw.[9] Under the instrumentalities of the Charter members agreed to cooperate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains reversible. At the same time a 19991, conference of the CSCE resulted in a document which affirmed that participating States would vigorously support the legitimately elected governments and in accordance with the United Nations vigorously oppose the overthrow or attempted overthrow of such governments by undemocratic means. At the same time, the much smaller European grouping the European Union chipped in its own bit by linking a more secure international peace to the continued evolution of constitutional democracy.

 

Another regional organization, the Organization of American States (OAS) also lent its weight to the worldwide democratic momentum. Like other international institutions during the cold war the OAS regarded non-intervention as a sacrosanct principle of inter-American relations. Each member viewed interference in its domestic affairs as highly provocative and inappropriate. Passed at a time when democracy was taking root in Latin America, the protocol made reference to the organization’s additional responsibility to promote and consolidate representative democracy with due respect for the principle of non-intervention. Five years later, the OAS agreed to advise and  assist governments in electoral matters by providing research, training, and support. In the following year, i.e. 1991, in Santiago, the OAS general assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 1080 on representative democracy. In essence it was recognized that the solidarity of the American States required that each member be a representative democracy and that the OAS be proactive in its efforts to preserve such republicanism. This groundbreaking resolution called for an urgent meeting: [10]

 

in the event of any occurrence giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional processes or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically government in any of the Organization’s member States

                                     

The resolution also included a provision for special sessions to look into the events collectively and adopt a any decisions deemed appropriate in accordance with the charter and international Law. Resolution 1080 thus transformed the OAS into an organization for which democracy is a condition of membership and an objective according to its charter. The OAS in its defence and preservation of democratic ideals has gone even further to to amend its charter by inserting provisions for the suspension of a member by a two-third vote in the General Assembly, if that State’s democratically elected Government has been overthrown by force. The rationale was that while democracy cannot be externally imposed on any country citizens living under democratic governance governance have the right to count on international action against threats to their democratic essence.

 

What is also usually ignored in discussing the global environment that appeared very conducive to democracy is the altered role of the Catholic Church. Historically the church was not averse to forging alliances with authoritarian regimes. In the early sixties, this alliance was largely ruptured by the second Vatican Council as well as an influx of new liberal clergy and lay activists in many countries. By the early 1970’s in country after country, the church had emerged as one of the most effective opponents of dictatorships. It is no accident for instance that Portugal and Spain were among the first countries to embrace democratization; meanwhile the only Catholic continent, South America was swept by democratization. A similar trend could be observed in the fact that the Philippines, Asia’s only Catholic country was the first country to democratize in East Asia. Poland and Hungary the two Catholic countries of East-Central Europe led the way in that part of the world. More pertinent to our current discussion is the fact that the African continent has not missed out on this healing touch from the Church. In Zaire, the Catholic Bishops were very forthright in questioning the excesses of Mobutu while Kenyan Bishops have adopted a similar posture towards the regime of Daniel Arap Moi. Ambassador Smith Hempstone while focusing on the Kenyan case has effected a measure of elaboration on the role of the churches in the crusade for democratization.[11] He contends for instance that no account of the struggle for freedom in Kenya would be complete without mentioning the role of the churches. He goes further to state that, when comparisons are made between the Catholics and the Anglicans the former tend to be more disciplined than their Episcopalian counterparts. Beyond comparisons however he gives a lot of credits to almost every strand of the religious landscape: Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Moslem clerics. In a sense the Kenyan scenario appears to have been replicated in other parts of the continent. Indeed one way of discerning whether any African country has reached a sad conjuncture can be observed in the timing and nature of pastoral letters that are caused to be read to congregations during Mass. A pastoral letter is something of a report card on the state of a country once it is issued, it is safe to assume that a fissure is beginning to appear in State-Society relations. 

 

Another external factor relates to what might be called the snowballing effect. There is the tendency for the democratic momentum to replicate itself once it has taken root in one country. It is certainly not an accident that after the East-Central European dictatorships collapsed, in 1989, democratization acquired a more global edge. However it is instructive to appreciate that the contagious effect of democratization cuts the other way round too. This is because authoritarian regimes also have the tendency to spawn their own mirror images.[12]

 

It should be noted however that with the exception of the resolves emanating from the church, most of the declarations and resolutions on democracy have little bearing on the African condition. This detachment has been deepened by the fact that African regional institutions like the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Community of West African States have not been as forthcoming on the issues of democracy. But in spite of this it was impossible for Africa to miss out on this out on this new wave in spite of the systemic variables, which characterize international relations. More importantly perhaps, it was also impossible for Africa to miss out on this new wave if only because some of the active and major status-quo exogamous powers in the continent had started to do a rethink (at least officially!) on the inter-related issues of democratization, human rights and political pluralism. These powers as we will go on to see include The United States, Britain and France. As regards the United States accounts tend to vary as regards what constitutes the turning point in Washington’s attitudes towards democratization. There is a seemingly definitive account which contends that consequent to a memorandum from Donald Peterson on the need for novel directions on US policy, the State Department organized a major conference in April 1990.At this conference, a major policy was formally articulated about the linkage between aid and the expansion of democracy. Not to be outdone Britain and France the two ex-colonial but enduring powers in the continent also spoke along the same lines. In the case of Whitehall, Britain came forth by contending that Britain would reward with financial aid African countries that are disposed towards principles like pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law human rights as well as market reforms.  Similarly in a well-publicized statement that has since become known as Le Baule Declaration, Francois Mitterand at this Franco-African summit effected a radical departure from shop-worn French policies. Rather than dwell on the usual syrupy rhetorics which tend to celebrate ties that bind France to her colonies, Miterrand chose to hand down the notice to the Francophone states that the endgame of dictatorship is come and that  the new game in town is democracy. According to him and in a way that would appear to be undemocratic, he bluntly stated: [13]

‘’ we have to talk about democracy. It is a universal value; when I say that it is the only way to achieve a state of equilibrium, I obviously have specifics in mind like representative democracy, free elections, a multi-party system freedom of the press an independent judiciary and no to censorship. As free peoples and sovereign peoples whom I respect it is up to you to decide on the path, and how you will choose to travel down and at what pace.”

 

In the light of the immediate foregoing the African Heads of States became conscious of the fact that a new conjuncture had been reached in their relations with France. The specifics of this conjuncture were such that henceforth aid commitments and disbursements from France would go mainly towards countries that embrace the ideals of democratization.

 

 

Take together it is easy to appreciate that one common strand which runs through the policies of France, Britain and the United States revolves around the linkage between aid and democratization. However how did this policy play out in the policy arena-particularly in the context of the respective interactions between these status-quo powers and African countries. It is also instructive to note that we have sketched out is a rather simplistic profile. It is simplistic to the extent that, as we will go on to see, these powers in their efforts to promote democratization were not only at odds with each other, they also engaged in policy somersaults which tended to suggest that democracy as desirable as an ideal to be promoted tends to clash with other national interests that are being pursued by other States. Moreover, it is also pertinent to state that not all the countries in Africa are really vulnerable to the pressures of the aid-democracy linkage. In relative terms Nigeria is relatively impervious to the threats, which revolve around the variables of aid and democratization. So, it is worth asking what are the other specific variables and dynamics which govern the attempts of external powers to promote democracy in Nigeria. Our response to this question can be found in the subsequent phase of this paper.

 

One feature which goes largely unremarked in much of the contemporary analysis which focuses on Nigeria’s quest for democratization is that long before the global system took an active stance on the issues of democratization, Nigeria adopted a democratic system of Government way back in 1979. [14]    Although the experiment collapsed in 1983, it bequeathed to the country a number of lessons. Perhaps the most obvious was that having tried the parliamentary system of Government in an earlier era, and having come to another sticky end via the presidential system of Government in 1983, it was clearly realized that the institutional framework of democracy is not as important as the attitudes and commitments of those operating the system. The second lesson stemmed from the fact that despite the ineptitude and incompetence, which characterized the aborted presidential system of Government, the fact of a democracy enabled Nigeria to avoid a costly war with Cameroon. This is because as stipulated in the presidential constitution, the country could not declare a war without consulting the two houses of the National Assembly. This immediate backdrop goes a long way to shed some light on the oft-quoted contention that the worst form of civilian rule is usually better than military rule of the best of descriptions.

 This hypothesis has since been validated in the long winter of military rule, which stretched from 1983 until some two years ago. Initially military rule as personified in the regimes of Buhari and Babangida did not attract any hostile reaction from the international system. This was quite understandable since the cold war was still on. However from the dawn of the 90s a new atmosphere began to take shape in the international system. It was an atmosphere in which western countries began to push for a new policy that spoke to features like: democracy, human rights and political pluralism. In other words if the Nigerian military had effected a withdrawal after say seven years-from 1983 to 1990,it would have been spared the ordeal of running against the international currents of democratization In the case of Nigeria it is also arguable that her resource profile is such that she is one African country that commands some attention outside the continent.  Increasingly such attention became more pronounced in the light of the Sisyphean character of Babangida’s transition project.

 

In seeking to contend this Sisyphean character of the Babangida administration, the United States put in place a number of measures that were designed to roll back the military impulse in Nigeria. Such measures include: [15]

 

-                           The immediate cancellation of the 11 million-dollar assistance that had been intended as budgetary support to Nigeria’s ministry of Health.

-                           Termination of all government-to-government military assistance and training except for counter-narcotics and military training.

-                           The withdrawal of the Nigerian military attaché in Washington and the simultaneous withdrawal of his opposite number from Lagos

-                           Termination of other development assistance, except for humanitarian aid channeled through non-governmental organizations.

 

In December 1993 following the assumption of power by General Sanni Abacha, these punitive measures were complemented by President Clinton who issued a proclamation under Section 212-(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Among other things the Act restricts entry into the United States of Nigerians who formulate, implement or benefit from policies, which hinders Nigeria’s transition to democracy. On the other side of the Atlantic Britain has also been involved in sending inclement,  if ambiguous signals to the military custodians of the then Nigerian State. Britain’s involvement was particularly significant because in view of her historical status in Nigeria,  her postures were capable of sending signals to international organizations like the Commonwealth and the European Union. The specifics of the measures taken by Britain include the withdrawal of military instructors and defence advisers from the National War College in Lagos. One remarkable phenomenon in this testy face-off between Nigeria on one hand and the Western powers particularly the United States was the rather transformed role of the United States Ambassador to Nigeria. As the military rule over-reached itself in Nigeria, Walter Carrington, Washington’s point man in Nigeria became more visible on the positive side of the democracy barricade. Indeed at a point in time he was clearly in the vanguard of the opposition to military rule in Nigeria. Analysts that sought to explain his behavior were of the view that his pigmentation was a source of bonding such that he could not but be visible on the side of pro-democracy forces in Nigeria. As attractive as this argument may appear to be, it ignored the fact that, earlier on, particularly under the Bush administration, another US ambassador played a similar role in Kenya. Consequently what best explains Carrington’s unusual diplomatic offensive was a new US policy that emphasized the promotion of democracy and human rights. [16]

 

What is however less appreciated is the fact that as the drama evolved between Nigeria and the western world, the military junta embarked on the policy of counter measures that sought to stem the Western offensive. In this respect Nigeria hired a number public relations firms to put its case across to the Washington policy community. An obvious indication of its success in this direction was when the US effected what appeared to be a policy reversal on Nigeria. This policy shift or reversal could be observed when President Clinton on a tour of South Africa spoke to the fact that the United States would not be averse to a civilianized Abacha presidency. The statements, which caused omniscient observers to wonder about what could be responsible for this turn-around on the part of Clinton also impelled Frank Smythe to pose the rather significant and ominous question: who got to Clinton? In part this investigative consultant and journalist  answered the question by revealing that it was one Gilbert Chagoury, a close business associate of Abacha who donated $460,000 to a non-profit voter registration group with close connections to the Democratic Party. [17]   Within Africa itself a similar trend could be observed. At ECOWAS summits for instance, while extensive focus are usually effected on the crisis situations in Sierra Leone and Liberia no such focus could be effected on Nigeria in view of her hegemonic profile in the sub-region. Within the larger African setting the OAU also refrained from discussing the Nigerian situation-this was in spite of the exertions of a number of African countries that tried to bring about an OAU position on the then crisis in Nigeria.

Even in its face-off with the western world the military junta had a lot of room within which to maneuver in view of the fact that the various forces in the western world had various and sometimes-antithetical interests to pursue. Two of such interests are worth mentioning here. In the construction industry, Julius Berger a German company emerged as the dominant variable in Nigeria. This was to the relative exclusion of British companies. Consequently as the Nigerian crisis unfolded Whitehall was more concerned not with the restoration of democracy in Nigeria but with how British companies would regain the initiative from Julius Berger. The other interest revolves around oil Carrington’s face-off with the Abacha regime alarmed the oil interests in Washington such that, as soon Carrington’s tour of duty was over he was replaced by a career diplomat ambassador Twadell whose antecedents are such that during his tenure in Nigeria he did not hesitate to subordinate the imperatives of democratization to a policy which sought to maintain the privileged access of American oil companies to the rich pickings of the Nigerian oil industry. [18]And it was just as well, for as relations worsened between Nigeria and the United States in the light of Carrington’s principled stance other countries in the western world were waiting in the wings hoping to benefit from any fall-out that might attend Abuja-Washington relations. Perhaps the only exception here is Canada. Ottawa served candid notice on the military junta that its time was up. She followed up this principled stance by severing diplomatic relations with Nigeria. Meanwhile in various world councils and gatherings she never passed up the opportunity to denounce and embarrass the Nigerian military junta. The (muted) reactions of British and American envoys speak volumes about how and why the ideals of democratization can easily be jettisoned in the context of other competing interests. Apparently, these realities must have weighed heavily on the mind of an Amnesty International official [19]who said that it is almost as if they i.e. the western powers perceive Nigeria to be too big a challenge. In a Freudian way this contention by the AI’s spokesman touches on the status of Nigeria as a minimal recipient of aid from the western world. The statement also speaks to the nature of democracy as an interest that is pursued in the context of the totality of other interests by policy makers. However, Nigeria is in a sense an exception in the continent since other countries like Tanzania, Gambia and Kenya are relatively vulnerable to aid induced pressures from the western world. Even then as we will shortly see in the case of Kenya, although Nairobi is a major aid recipient yet the Kenyan ruling class  has been able to thwart a thoroughgoing consummation of the democratic process by external forces.

 

 

Kenya and Democratization: The International Factors

 

With the end of the cold war, the United States and other western powers served notice on Kenya that the moment for democratization had come. The policy shift was in part catalyzed by the fact that domestic elements in Kenya itself were quick to grasp the potentials of the demonstration effect of the momentous changes in places like the former Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia. In both of these places, mass popular movements toppled entrenched authoritarian governments. Even within Africa itself, single party systems appeared to be collapsing. Meanwhile in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda agreed to hold elections and lost by a wide margin. But in spite of this altered landscape Arap Moi of Kenya continued to insist that the multiparty system was a non-option since according to him it would merely further polarize Kenyan society along ethnic lines.

 

In early 1989 however a new variable was introduced into the Kenyan political scene.[20]   This new variable nearly altered the tenor of politics in Kenya. This was in the form of the appointment of Smith Hempstone as new US ambassador to Kenya. In a way that could be said to be completely out of tune with the staid and stuffy ways of orthodox diplomacy, Ambassador Hempstone emerged visibly and actively on the positive side of the democracy barricade. He consorted openly with the pro-democracy forces and at the same time he used every opportunity to tell the Kenyan establishment that multipartysm was the new game in town. At the same time he gave succour and protection to opposition forces. The most surprising thing was that Smith Hempstone comes across as the least likely person to accord any fillip to the pro-democracy movement in Kenya. This is because as labels go,  he is a rightist who has served an extensive stint on the equally rightist newspaper The Washington Times. Moreover his political convictions are such that they run against what can be described as the currents of progressive opinion in Africa. Ambassador Hempstone ,   an ardent supporter of Jonas Savimbi, also believes that sanctions should not be applied against the then apartheid regime. Even when the idea of democratization was mooted in the Washington policy community, he advanced strenuous arguments as why democratization and multiparty system will not take root in Africa or even Kenya for that matter. Yet it appears that, within a few months as Chief of the US mission in Kenya, he started to campaign for a more wholesome Kenya that will be run along democratic lines. The question then is: what transformed Hempstone into a reformer? The answer seems to lie in the fact that he was not exactly new to Kenya.  He had lived in the country in an earlier era and to this extent on his return to Kenya he was able to appreciate on a first hand basis the rut and decadence that despotism had inflicted on this East African country. Moreover as a newspaperman and a political appointee he was able to approach his ambassadorial job with a measure fresh candour that defies the stuffy world of diplomacy. Thereafter,  a cornerstone of his policy revolved around the dictum of afflicting the comfortable and comforting the afflicted.[21] However in spite of the Manichean nature of the situation in Kenya,  other social forces within and outside Kenya gave Hempstone a good run for his wholesome and justly moralistic devices. We shall examine in turn each of these social forces.

 

Within Kenya itself, opposition to Kenya came from social forces, which range from President Moi himself to Kenyan legislators and the obsequious components of the county’s media. These various forces subjected Hempstone and his activities to various forms of misinformation and disinformation. There were even reports to the effect that arrangements were on to ensure his untimely demise. The skeptical mind that is inclined to dismiss this report,  only has to remember that a number of politically motivated assassinations constitute an integral part of Kenya’s post-colonial history. Within the diplomatic corps itself, and barring the exceptions of the German and Scandinavian missions,  the reactions of the rest of the diplomatic community ranged from indifference to hostility. Whitehall’s stance is worth recalling here. The British High Commissioner was very supportive of the Moi administration and indeed whenever, Hempstone chose to speak truth to power the British envoy was always on hand to neutralize him.[22] Meanwhile Hempstone also had to contend with a measure of incestuous opposition from the State Department. Apparently the old guards in Washington were not used to Hempstone’s kind of activist diplomacy and in view of this a lot of efforts were put in place to undermine him. Even then, such are the long shadows spawned by real politique that,  Hempstone himself had to back-pedal on his stance when Washington desperately needed Kenya’s help in respect of an urgent need provide a haven for stranded anti-Gaddaffi dissidents. [23]

 

We have delved fairly extensively into these various forces with a view to showing up the fact that the struggle for democratization in real life situations like Kenya and Nigeria is really a struggle of contending interests where morality and didactic values have to necessarily assume back-seat positions. At the end of the day however particularly in the light of Kenya’s exposure to the donors and creditors in the international system, Kenyan authorities had to accede to the principle and practice of multipartysm. The outcome could not have been otherwise particularly in the light of Kenya’s relationship with the western powers. It is a relationship in which aid looms very large. Alison Van Rooy renders this situation in graphical terms when in a comparative vein she asserts that against a background of falling private capital flows, aid carves out a substantial 8 per cent in Kenya. By contrast she contends that a country like Hungary generates less than 1 per cent of its gross national product from aid-a profile that is dwarfed by the nearly 19 per cent earned in private capital flows.[24] Evidence from other sources appears to corroborate this pattern. Guy Arnold reveals for instance that western bilateral donors constitute over 93 per cent of the total external support for Kenya’s economic development.[25] It is therefore not surprising that owing to this rather dense network of aid flows, Arap Moi was forced to widen the political space in response to western pressures. Indeed, but for the fractious and self-serving antics of the opposition forces,  the process of democratization would have resulted in a much more absolute outcome. This is because in the first multi-party elections that were held in Kenya, the combined votes of the opposition candidates outstripped those of Moi.

 

 

 

 

Conclusions

 

In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze the impact of external forces in democratization.  Contrary to what obtains in the literature as regards the relative helplessness of the custodians of the African state, this is not really so. Indeed on a number of occasions some of these African States have a lot of room in which to maneuver.  This maneuverability was particularly pronounced with Nigeria. Abuja is relatively impervious to aid related threats. By contrast Kenya as we have seen is not as privileged. Still despite this relatively underdog situation President Arap Moi still managed to retain the initiative. There is no doubt however that a lot has changed in these two social formations. In the case of Nigeria she managed to do away with the military and in the case of Kenya the political system though with Moi still at the apex is now much more open. But this could well be regarded as the end of the sweet story. This is because the past tends to loom very large in the political landscape of these countries. As regards Nigeria the country is yet to free herself from the over-hang of military rule. A retired General is the Nigerian President at the moment and current indications seem to suggest that another retired General might well replace him. Needless to say years of military rule have stunted the political class such that the country is still virtually beholden to the khaki syndrome. A close look at the international forces reveals that their efforts to promote democracy can only be realistically evaluated in the contexts of other interests that they necessarily have to pursue. In other words for the average policy maker, the State has to be run and to that extent democracy is just one of those issues that is on the agenda. Thus the analyst who views the issue of democracy through the lens of morality is in for a shock. As regards Nigeria for instance when the visible support of the United for democracy was beginning to undermine other critical interests she took active steps to protect such interests. Very much the same thing can be said for other countries like Germany and Britain. As regards Britain, her emotional baggage among other interests is such that you are not likely to count her on the positive side of the democracy barricade. However talking of interests-it is quite evident that, there are interests and there are interests-long-term and short-term. At the end of the day it is in the long-term interests of external forces to support democracy in Africa. This is because even those short to medium interests will be best served in an African continent that is democratized. At the same time, one should not lose sight of the fact that the unpredictability inherent in the international system, is such that, it is unwise for the democracy-inclined social forces to rely unduly on external powers. As history has shown this is an attitude that is fraught with limitations. As observed in the opening quote of this paper democracy was put in place in the post-1945 era largely at the urgings of Washington, and then the cold war set in and to this extent, the US had to contend with other urgent issues. Against this background,  it is in place to pose this question: suppose a new threat emerges for the United States tomorrow? It does not take much to appreciate that in this kind of situation the ozone to the democratic momentum will no longer be forthcoming from the external realm. This has happened before and there is nothing to suggest that it cannot happen again. This is precisely why the various pro-democracy forces on the continent should increasingly try to rely on their own resources. As difficult as this may seem, this is one sure way of consolidating on the minimal gains of the previous decade                                  

 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

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