Pakistan
on the a Precipice
Ameen Jan·
at… (we probably have this information already)
More
than 11 years after its return to civilian democracy from a period of
protracted military rule, Pakistan is undergoing a political
crisis, institutional collapse, and severe economic problems. The country’s
political crisis is caused by increased ethnic fragmentation and the growth of
religious extremism, accompanied by the centralization of political power
in the hands of the current Prime Minister. The government’s assault on already
ineffective civilian institutions, in favor of greater control by the executive
and the military, has heightened political dissatisfaction. Dire economic
conditions, resulting from both long-term economic mismanagement and more recent
developments—,including
imposition of sanctions after Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, —are further accelerating
social and political divisions. Continuing adventurism in Afghanistan and
Kashmir has deeply soured regional relations and contributed to growing
militarism. These concurrent dynamics seriously endanger Pakistan’s stability,
and, by extension, that of its neighbors.
Unless
the process of political fragmentation and institutional collapse is arrested
and reversed, serious threats to Pakistan’s internal and
regional security loom. A politically unstable Pakistan could result in
widespread civil violence among a population of more than 130 million, increaseding domestic and
international terrorism, the wholesale replacement of civilian state institutions
by the military, and divisions within the military itself. The government of
Pakistan must take immediate steps to contain and reverse the unfolding
political crisis. Key external players, including the United States, Japan, and
the European Union (EU), should use their political and
economic leverage on and provide incentives to Pakistan to
prevent such a catastrophe from occurring in the world’s newest nuclear weapons
state.
.Growing political divisions, weakening civilian
institutions, a collapsing economy, and foreign adventurism require immediate
and long-term measures by the Pakistan government and the international community. [OK[I argue with myself over whether to include this sentence
here. If you have a strong preference
against it, say so. I’m sure that the
technical editor will insist that we remove the elipses (…) in the sub headers,
though]]
The political situation in
Pakistan in the first half of 1999 was marked by increased centralization of
power in the hands of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The parliamentary
opposition, which increasingly represents a variety of competing[[okay? Trying to convey that there is competition
among these interests]] ethnic-based interests, has been
effectively frozen out of political power. Concurrently, albeit for different
reasons, a new and growingform of political opposition is taking the ,
in the guise of extremist religious groups that combine physical violence with electioneering [[okay?]], seek to completely overturn
the present parliamentary system in favor of a strict interpretation of Islamic
law. In order to curb the spread of
internal political violence by both ethnic-based political parties and
extremist religious groups - —termed
“terrorism” by the government— - Sharif’s
government resorted to extra-judicial measures, including use
of paramilitary forces and summary courts.
When he
assumed office in February 1997, Sharif rapidly embarked on a process to
consolidate power. His party’s overwhelming parliamentary majority - —137
out of 205 seats in the National Assembly – —allowed
him to take steps that previous governments were
unable tocould not. First, he nullified during his first few months in office the
maligned eighth Constitutional amendment that had been passed by General Zia
ul-Haq in 1985. This amendment had given,
which gave the Presidency the
authority to dismiss the government and call for new elections.
There was widespread political consensus on overturning this provision, not
least because, since
1988,it
had since 1988 been used thrice by two
different presidents against both Sharif and his main rival, Benazir Bhutto. Shortly following that,Only
months later, another law prohibiting parliamentarians
Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) [OK[I realize that in Pakistan and elsewhere “parliamentarian” means MP; since MP is more common
usage and since the more general definition of “parliamentarian” is “one who is
well versed in the rules of parliamentary procedure,” I have changed the language throughout]]from
violating party discipline was passed. The backdrop to this was the rampant
aisle crossing, or “horse trading,” where
legislators’ votes could be bought with ease, which had characterized
previous parliamentary sessions, where legislators’ votes could be bought with ease.
The new law against this practice ensured that any divisions within Sharif’s
own party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), would result in suspension
of the dissenting parliamentarians
being suspended. ItMNAs.
It also ensured that there would be no effective
means of dissent against Sharif in
parliamentby opposition parties prior to the next elections, which
are not expected until __________[[date?]]. do not have to be called until 2002.
Initially,
Sharif built alliances with some of the other parties that had won
parliamentary seats in the smaller provinces. These included, importantly, the
Muttahida (previously Muhajir)Qawmi
Movement (MQM), which has the strongest political support in Karachi, and the
Awami National Party (ANP) in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Both of
these alliances were short-lived.
Since 1997, the ANP, in order to gain political mileage among members of the province’s dominant ethnic
group, had advocated changing the name of the province
NWFP to “Pakhtunkhwa.,” which would reflect the dominant
ethnic group in the province. The Sharif government refused to
consider this demand for fear of inflaming ethnic tensions in the province, and
the ANP terminated its alliance with the PML on February 27, 1998.
On
October 17, 1998, a widely respected figure and former
governor of Sindh, Hakim Saeed, was assassinated in Karachi.,
which T the
government accused the MQM of engineering
the assassination and . Sharif
immediately suspended the Sindh Provincial Assembly and imposed Governor’s rule
in the province, effectively terminating his party’s alliance with the MQM.
Even though Sharif’s PML held the parliamentary majoritywas the single largest party in Sindh and therefore headed its provincial government [[corrections
accurate?]], the MQM and Benazir Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) together controlled 65 out of 109 provincial
parliamentary seats, which necessitated that the PML collaborate with them to
conduct provincial affairswas the third largest party, behind both the PPP (34
seats) and the MQM (28 seats), in the 109-seat
provincial assembly, an alliance with the MQM allowed it to form the provincial
government. However, the political bargain with the MQM involved significant
concessions from the PML,
including release of political prisoners, several lucrative ministerial
positions, and the governorship of the province (to which
the PML never acceded). The PML's subsequent action
to suspend the assembly in favor of central rule sent a strong message to the MQM
opposition parliamentarians MPs [[or should this be members of
legislative assembly?]] that
the PML simply had
no intention to include them it
in governing the province.
More recently, in AApril 1999,
a politicized judiciary convicted Sharif’s main political opponent, Benazir
Bhutto, and her husband of corruption during her stint in office and barred
them from holding public office, in addition to imposing five-year jail terms
and a heavy fine. Few doubted that Bhutto had engaged in massive corruption
during her previous term in office, but the targeted nature of the inquiry that
exonerated Sharif and his own cohorts from the same process made her conviction
appear to be little more than a witch hunt. With
Bhutto effectively barred from political activity, Sharif has ensured that the
PPP, which like the PML remains a highly personalized party, will be unlikely
to challenge his power effectively.
In
parallel with these efforts to squeeze out the opposition from any share of
political power, the PML government also took major steps to curb press
freedoms during early 1999. Since the end of the Zia dictatorship in 1988,
Pakistan has developed a robust press that presents views spanning the
political spectrum and does not shy from being highly critical of any incumbent
government. In February 1999, the government targeted one of the largest
newspaper groups in the country, the Jang Group, and accuseding it of tax evasion. Rather than takeing the newspaper
to court, the government simply refused to release imported newsprint which the
Jang Group had already paid for. The true reason
for this action, most many independent
observers noted [I DON’T HAVE ANY CITES HERE[cites?? The basic editor is that when the author
refers to other analyses, cites should be given. Generally in this manuscript the “observers” notes seem noncontroversial and the author’s, well, authority, is sufficient. If you can dredge up citations without
difficulty, though, any remaining
doubts would be assuaged.]],
for this action was that the Jang
Group had been critical of the government and had not buckled under government
pressure to sack certain journalists. The then-chairperson of the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asma
Jehangir, claimed that the government was bent upon destroying the press
because it was bringing to light its misdeeds.
In May,
the government’s crackdown on the press took a nastier turn when a prominent
journalist, Najam Sethi, the editor of The Friday Times, a weekly newspaper
that was highly critical of the Sharif government, was arrested and beaten in a
midnight raid for alleged anti-state activities. Again, many independent commentators [[cites??]]believed the truethe
real reason for the arrest was
Sethi’s recent interview with the BBC for a documentary being
produced on corruption by Sharif and his associates. Other
critical journalists, some with ties to the opposition PPP, were also arrested
and beaten. At the same time, the Punjab provincial government, (whose
Chief Minister is Sharif’s own brother), banned some 2000 non--governmental organizations,
froze freezing their bank accounts
and and seizeding their assets, and threatened
similar action against the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
Sharif’s
efforts at centralizing political power and squeezing out parliamentary and
other opposition from all forms of political activity are being undertaken
against a backdrop of increasing ethnic fragmentation in the country. Political
violence along ethnic lines has centered in Sindh province over the past
decade. The emergence of the MQM during the Zia years–—,with with its political agenda based on
protecting the ethnic interests of the muhajir
community, largely
second- and third-generation Muslim migrants from India, in Pakistan, -—signaled a new phase in
ethnic politics.[1]
The fact that the MQM virtually controlled Karachi, the largest port city and
commercial capital of the country, made it a force to be reckoned with.
Successive governments have repeatedly suppressed the MQM’s demands in order
not to allow Karachi to become independent of central authority. The MQM’s and
its offshoots’ own brutal tactics have, in the view of many Pakistanis [NONE[cites??]], l, legitimized the use of violence by
the state to curb their demands. This politics of violence on both sides has
led to increasing radicalization of the MQM and the creation of new and more
firebrand splinter groups. Karachi, which has significant pockets of all the
other ethnic groups of Pakistan, has from time to time therefore suffered
serious ethnic violence.
Whilest Karachi has suffered the most from
such violence, ethnicity increasingly defines the political platforms of other
parties in the country. The ANP in NWFP,
which called in 1997 for renaming of the province as Pakhtunkhwa,
and the Baluch National Party (BNP) in Baluchistan both represent ethnic
interests. Even the PPP, which
was relegated to which captureding the
bulk of itsfew parliamentary seats from
outside of rural
Sindh in the 1996 elections, no longer appears able
to represent interests beyond those of the Bhutto family’s ethnic
constituency. The ruling PML, which gained the bulk of its political support
from the majority Punjab province in the
last election1996, and which is heavily dominated by
Punjabi landowners and industrialists, is viewed by many as primarily
representing Punjabi interests. Sharif’s recent measures to centralize
political power and marginalize the other political parties has added to the
sense of ethnic hegemony by Punjab and strengthened
reinforced the ethnic baseis of the opposition. [2]
Ethnicity
has been an underlying factor in Pakistani politics since the country’s
creation. Punjabi officers heavily dominate the most powerful institution in
the country, the army, and the bureaucratic
administration of cy
which administers the state is similarly composed. The retention
of institutional power by Punjabi,
and, to a lesser measure, Pashtun, elites has
historically fuelled ethnic dissatisfactions. The lead-up to the 1971 civil
war, in which the ethnically mobilized Bengali population of East Pakistangainedsought independence, [[change okay?]], was
Pakistan’s first catastrophic conflict with sharp ethnic overtones. Shortly
thereafter, a Baluch nationalist uprising was brutally suppressed by Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, and,
in the years since, ethnic-based political agendas have
increasingly been voiced among populations from rural Sindh, Karachi, and the
NWFP. Adding to these divisions, sectarian violence has more recently gripped
the country, especially in Punjab. The rise of militant sectarianism, between Shi’a and Sunni Muslim
groups, is a new phenomenon. While sectarian
divisions have existed and been politicized in
Pakistan for many years, they are now militarized in a way not seen previously.
External support, primarily from Saudi and Iranian sources, to extremist groups
on both sides has fuelled these divisions.
Notably,
a spate of new Sunni extremist parties has emerged from the madrassas, or religious schools, along
Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan. M, many madrassasof
which are run by the religious political party the
Jamiat Ulema Islami (JUI);. Ssome
of these madrassasare
funded from Saudi sources and are the germinating ground for the Taliban,
who have effectively conquered the bulk of Afghanistan since their emergence in
1994. Like the Taliban - —which
is a genuine cross-border movement involving
supported by the
military [OK[I read this as militaryàsources,
generally. If you meant to emphasise
the Pakistani military in particular, then we should return the “the” before
military]]as well as ethnic, political,
and economic networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan - —several
of the sectarian groups that operate in Pakistan, such as Sipah-i-Sahaba and
Harakat-ul Mujahideen, have emerged from the same madrassas and ascribe to the same philosophy, rooted in the
Deobandi school of Islam, that is strongly anti-Shi’a. The Deobandi madrassas are based predominantly in the
tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan, and their students come largely from poor,
rural backgrounds. Sectarian groups, such as Ahle Hadith, have also emerged
from urban areas. Shi’a sectarian groups, such as Sipah-i-Muhammad, have also
formed, many with external financial support
from Iran[OK[okay?]],, at least in part to counter the emergence of
Sunni groups.
The
magnitude of the sectarian problem in Pakistan is clear. In 1997, witnessed a
dramatic increase in sectarian violence within Punjab,sectarian
violence within Punjab increased dramatically, resulting in hundreds of
deaths. This trend has continued since then, notwithstanding efforts by the
government to impose law and order. However, because the activities of these
groups are geographically diffuse and their acts and
organization [[okay?]] are
of a terrorist nature – —such
as attacks on worshippers in mosques – —it
is far more difficult to control than urban-based
ethnicviolence such as that in is limited to a city like Karachi. [OK[okay?]]. SMembership
in some of these extremist groups have
also gained followgrew ing
after the August 1998 U.S. bombing of suspected terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan, an act that many in Pakistan viewed as an unprovoked
attack on fellow Muslims by an arrogant Western superpower.
In
November 1998, at a political rally in the NWFP, Sharif praised the Taliban’s
enforcement of Islamic law and suggested that he favored such a legal system in
Pakistan. In the same month, the Parliament’s lower house, which is dominated
by the PML, passed the fifteenth Constitutional amendment establishing Islamic
law (shari’a).[3]
Yet, Sharif’s action did not correspond with the agendas of the religious
extremist groups, which reject the current democratic political system altogether.
Sharif
intended that his own position would be further strengthened by garnering the support of the Islamic
parties, much like that of his erstwhile political mentor
General Zia ul-Haq, who launched an Islamization program in Pakistan during
the eighties in order to legitimize his own rule. However, Sharif’s attempt did
not bear the same fruit. All [[all? Did these groups oppose
implementation of the amdt in NWFP (see next para)??]] of tThese
extremist Islamic groups,
as well as the more mainstream Islamic parties that participated in the democratic system, such as
the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), uniformly rejected Sharif’s efforts to
establish shari’a, which they vieweded as a
political ploy to enhance his own power. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the leader of the JI, criticized Sharif at a major political rally
in Islamabad in October 1998. He by
claimed ing
that those in power lacked courage and competence to implement
Islamic law:.
“They have grabbed more and more powers through constitutional amendments,
turned the office of president redundant, and destroyed the sanctity of the
judiciary.,” he claimed. In contrast, he said, the
JI campaign was aimed at giving the country an honest leadership and a
corruption-free society through the establishment of a system based on the
Islamic code. [I GOT THE QUOTE FROM A NEWS WIRE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY
DON’T HAVE ACCESS TO IT NOW[again, a cite would be helpful]].
Two
levels of political opposition to the government exist – : one
seeksing
increased autonomy on the basis of ethnicity within Pakistan’s
the existing federal system and the
other seeksing
to overthrow the present system in favor of an Islamic regime. Each of these
trends includes variations on the moderate-extremist scale. However, the trend
at both levels in both cases is towards
greater extra-parliamentary mobilization and extremismviolence.
This mobilization is in response both to
a, as thegovernment
that
favorss
suppressing rather than including parliamentary opposition in governing the
country and to economic and
social pressures that provide an increasingly fertile ground for religious extremism and
curbs press freedoms,
and as the ground for religious extremism becomes more fertile.. [[if the gov’t activity is the cause of “more
fertile ground for religious freedom” then the deleted clause was properly deleted; if
not, then the clause should be returned and the additional grounds explained in
a sentence.]] The government has had far greater success in restricting deflecting
demands of the
opposition political parties than of the
religious extremist groups. In fact, under growing pressure from the Islamic political groups, shari’a was for the first time formally
enacted as the law of the land in January 1999 in several border districts in
NWFP.Unlike
Sharif’s attempt to strengthen his own position byintroducing
the shari’a bill in Parliament, the reality in these border
districts is that Islamic law has been imposed by fiat and
not through parliamentary process. Political authority
to change and enforce the law therefore
resides with local power brokers,
not the central government. [I
HOPE THE POINT IS CLEARER NOW[I’m not sure of your point: earlier
you seemed to say that “the
problem” was Sharif not including opposing forces’ opinions when formulating
policy; now you describe that restriction as a success; I would guess that the heart of the
matter is that he is including
the ‘wrong’ (undemocratic, illiberal) groups.
Should I/you worry about the tone of this sentence?]].
Weakening Civilian Institutions And
Growing Military Control…
S
Sharif’s
effort at consolidation has also involved changing the balance of power in the
country’s institutional apparatus, away from an independent judiciary and in
favor of a strengthened role for the executive, in close co-operation with the
military. The first important example of the tussle between the executive and
the judiciary was the confrontation between the Chief Justice and the Prime
Minister in late 1997, when the Chief Justice held Sharif in contempt of court
for using derogatory language against him and other members of the bench. This
episode was resolved in Sharif’s favor when he created a revolt in the Supreme
Court that led to the against
the sitting chief justice’s, leading to his resignation. [OK[okay?]]. Shortly
thereafter, because of his opposition to Sharif’s strong-arm approach to
subjugate the judiciary, the
President,
Farooq Leghari,
also resigned and was replaced by a Sharif family friend, Rafiq Tarar.
In
1997, the PML-dominated Parliament passed a law giving the Prime Minister
direct control over the accountability process (Eehtesab) [Urdu word[is this a
proper noun (in which case should not be italicized) or an Urdu word (in which
case it should be italicized)]]) that had been
initiated to bring to book those high officials accused of corruption in the
previous Bhutto regime. A close Sharif confidant, Senator Saifur Rahman,
chaired the ehtesabEhtesab
process. This process entirely bypasseds
the judiciary entirely—, which has
theis constitutionally
designated
authority to try all civil and criminal cases—, in favor of Sharif himself being the
arbiter of the previous government’s misdeeds. In the same vein, in 1997 the
Parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),
which gave police sweeping powers to use lethal force against anyone
committing, or believed to be about to commit, a terrorist offence. Special
courts were established to conduct summary trials of persons charged with such
offences. Major international human rights advocacy groups, including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, condemned the passage of the ATA. In a scathing
criticism, Amnesty International wrote:
(T)he existing legal and judicial system is already equipped to deal with all the offences referred to in the Act. The problem then seems to be a lack of implementation, not a lack of laws. Amnesty International believes that recourse to a law which explicitly dispenses with constitutionally secured fundamental rights will not in the long term secure the rule of law. . . . Reforming the police, strengthening the judiciary, and insisting at every level on the strict implementation of the existing law are alone able to restore respect for the rule of law and secure fundamental rights for all citizens of Pakistan.[4]
The
government’s assault on the judiciary continued. In November 1998, the
government superceded the ATA and established summary military courts in Sindh
to curb terrorism and restore law and order. Subsequently, Sharif declared his
intention of extendingto
establish the military courts to
the other provinces of the countrythroughout
Pakistan. Political violence was indeed rife in Sindh during 1998, which
neither the civilian police and courts nor the Special Courts established by
the ATA were able to stem, partly because of rampant corruption in the civilian
law enforcement and judicial apparatus and partly because of the scale of
violence. The establishment of military courts had a temporary calming
influence, partly because the well-paid military is less amenable to small-time
corruption, but the lull came at a terrible price to civilian institutions and
respect for human rights. Paramilitary forces (Rangers) patrolled the streets
of Karachi, arresting criminals and “terrorists,”, trying them and sentencing the
guilty, all in very short order. In early 1999, several suspects, with ties to the MQM, were arrested, tried, found guilty,
and executed in the span of a few weeks. While many of those apprehended by the
military courts may in
fact be guilty ofhave committed the crimes as charged, the
fact that due process under law has been so severely curtailed means that there
is very little recourse to an appeals process and innocent people may be
punished as a result. Needless to say, the system of military courts also lends
itself to political manipulation by those in power.[5]
In
response to the government’s establishment of military courts, the Supreme
Court of Pakistan declared on 17
February 17, 1999,
that the military courts were unconstitutional. Whilest recognizing the problem of
terrorism in Karachi and other parts of the country, the Supreme Court ordered
that all cases pertaining to such incidents be dealt with by the Special Courts
established by the ATA. The government accepted this verdict. In effect, having
taken an extreme position by establishing military courts, the government was
able to shift the center of the debate on how to combat internal violence.
In that context, ,
so that the the
Special Courts, with all their extra-judicial powers, became an
acceptable solution to the beleagured judiciary.
In
contrast to his dealings with the judiciary, Sharif has tried to forge a close
partnership with the military, the institution that remains the ultimate
arbiter of Pakistan’s political destiny. In late 1998, the prime minister
purged the top brass of the military and picked a new COAS, General Pervez Musharraf.
Sharif also replaced the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) [OK[hyphenated Inter-Services
correct?]], , a
quasimilitary organization that has been on the front line of implementing
Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan. His purge of the military top leadership, including the moderate former chief Jahangir
Karamat, and imposition
of military courts in Sindh was
anwere important steps
in placing his handpicked gGenerals
in charge and providing them with a more
important substantial
institutional role
in the countryresources. In addition to maintaining
internal security, the military is also increasingly involved in running other civilian institutions. In
November 1998, the entire management of the large Water and Power Development
Authority (WAPDA) was suspended and the military was inducted to run the
utility. Other civilian public sector institutions, many observers believe,
[[cites??]]may
may also be in line for a Sharif-sanctioned take over by the military. These
steps give the military a stake in allowing Sharif to rule while they reap the
economic benefits of controlling major revenue-generating public institutions.
Handing
increased civil authority to the military has important political consequences.
Punjabis and Pashtuns have historically dominated Pakistan’s military forces.
When the army is called upon to intervene in civil affairs—, to maintain law and order or run
public institutions like WAPDA, —ethnic
dissatisfactions are further fuelled because minorities see these ethnic groups
as being firmly in power. Second, while the military as an institution may have
little interest in formally assuming power, not least because it would then
have to take responsibility for managing the deep economic and social problems
afflicting the country, a key role in civilian affairs creates a situation in
which the army can gain all the benefits of ruling without any of its
responsibilities. This provides the military with a strong vested interest in
institutionalizing its role in civil affairs, especially in public sector
functions that are potentially lucrative.
However,
events in May and June 1999 in Kashmir strongly suggest that Sharif still does
not wield the desired control over the military. Hundreds of army regulars and
Islamic militants invaded some heights in
Kargil and Drass sectors inside Indian Kashmir to which India
responded by sending thousands of its troops to retake the positions. Fierce
fighting resulted in a death toll of thousands, primarily of Indian forces who
were at a tactical disadvantage, and displacement of many more civilians from
areas near the contested territory. TWhile
the government repeatedly asserted that Kashmir was witnessing a national
uprising of Kashmiri mujahideen,
it is now well accepted thathat
the Pakistan army was centrally involved in planning and executing the
occupation of some heights in Indian-held Kashmir is
now well accepted.[6]
Many commentators in Pakistan continue to believe that this action was taken by
the army without Sharif’s direct involvement. Not only that, but Islamic
militants fought side by side with Pakistan army regulars in Kashmir,
indicating a growing Islamist trend within the military’s officer ranks and
raising troubling questions about the army's dispensation in favor of religious
extremism.[7]
The domestic political fallout of events in Kashmir – spurred by Sharif’s urgent visit to Washington on July 4, 1999, to meet U.S. President Clinton and the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Indian portions of Kashmir – is still unfolding at the time of this writing. Sharp divisions have emerged between Sharif and General Musharraf, who engineered the incursion into Kashmir. Speculation is rife of an impending military coup d’etat or dismissal of Musharraf. If a military coup d’etat does occur, ending the 11-year period of Pakistan’s latest democratic experiment, and a military regime takes control of the country, sectarian groups and their agendas may well benefit at the expense of the secular constitutional status of Pakistan.
The
poor economic situation in the country is a result of long-term and more recent
factors. Because a majority of the
parliamentarians in Pakistan’s
MNAs are feudal landlords, they have resisted
imposing any taxes on agriculture, which remains the country’s economic base.
Revenues are largely generated through imposition of customs duties, sales
taxes, and income tax on the
salaried people. The middle class therefore bears the burden of
taxation. Because tax revenues are far below government expenditures, Pakistan
borrows heavily from international financial institutions. With a total foreign
debt burden of more than $30 billion, the
bulkfully 40% of public expenditure goes towards
debt servicing (40 percent). The military consumes
another 26% of the pie. Little therefore remains for development, especially
given the high degree of corruption at all levels of the public sector.
Another
important structural factor is the linkage of the Afghan economy to that of
Pakistan. Because there is little productive activity in war-torn Afghanistan (except for the cultivation of poppy
cultivation continues), basic commodities such as wheat and cooking oil
are smuggled from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Similarly, consumer goods are
exported from the Gulf states through Afghanistan and smuggled into Pakistan
for sale. The government loses valuable customs revenues because of this
smuggling, and the price of basic commodities is pushed
upwards due to higher demand [OK[deleted phrase
is tangential (I think)]].. Drug trafficking
networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan generate considerable foreign exchange
through the sale of heroin and other drugs that are cultivated mainly in
Afghanistan and distributed to Europe and beyond. [TANGENTIAL[how does this
foreign exchange find its way to the Pakistani gov’t? (Is this a tangential question?)]].
In
1998, several developments contributed to worsening what was structurally
already a precarious position. First, the Sharif government’s
brought before ehtesabEEhtesab
bbureau
suspended
the operations of many many
of the foreign investors who had set up independent power plants
(IPPs) to generate and supply much-needed
electric power to the country. The reason for this was that the IPPs had
allegedly - —and
not surprisingly - —bribed
officials in the previous Bhutto government for their contracts. Indeed, the
pattern of bribing high level associates of Bhutto during her term in office
was not limited to the IPPs, but was a practice that prevailed for virtually
any investor that needed government clearance. The net effect of the
government’s action against the IPP’s,
which resulted in their operations being suspended, was to scare
off potential foreign investors who viewed
preferred not tothe
risk of their own
contracts being terminated at on the
whims of one or another government.
as being too high.
Following
India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan tested its own nuclear weapons
capability, which swiftly resulted in economic sanctions being imposed, notably
by the U.S.
and Japan. Fearing massive capital flight, the government froze all foreign
exchange accounts, which further undermined domestic and foreign investor
confidence. At the same time, the global financial crisis had resulted in higher
interest rates for most developing countries.
being affected by higher interest rates; Pakistan’s
response to these global and domestic economic troubles was to threaten to
default on its foreign debt obligations. The international reactions
were was predictable: foreign
governments and the IMF have tossed Pakistan a lifeline and private foreign
investors have stayed away. All major
credit-rating agencies lowered Pakistan’s
sovereign debt rating to their lowest grade; except for Afghanistan,
Pakistan is now considered the riskiest country in the region for foreign
investors.[8]
Fearing
domestic instability in Pakistan in late 1998, the USU.S.
eased economic sanctions on Pakistan related to non-military items and, in
early 1999, decided to bailout Pakistan by allowing the IMF to grant new loans to the government.In
January 1999, the IMF announced a $1.56 billion loan over a three-year period
and released the first tranche of $575 million. [[you have
described the IMF bailout (which I moved below because the topic sentence is on
the U.S.). How exactly did the U.S.
bail out Pakistan? New loans?
Suspended sanctions?]]The IMF released in January 1999 the first tranche
of $575 million of a $1.56 billion loan over a three-year period. The loan is a
very short-term solution, with stringent economic and political conditions
attached. The main political condition imposed by the U.S. is
tangible efforts by Pakistan toward non-proliferation, including its signing
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Responding to these pressures, Pakistan
(as well as India) agreed to sign the CTBT
during summer 1999, in an atmosphere that was not “coercive.”[9]
However, with the sharp deterioration of Indo-Pak relations following events in
the summer, the CTBT issue seems to have temporarily disappeared from the
agenda.
By the end of September (at the time of this writing), the government was
in discussions with the IMF
regarding the second disbursement of the loan, which was delayed due to the
government's inability to meet the tax-related conditions and additional
concerns raised by the IMF regarding newly announced public spending priorities. In January
1999, the IMF announced a $1.56 billion loan over a three-year period and
released the first tranche of $575 million. The loan is a very short-term solution, with
stringent economic and political conditions attached.In August 1999 (at the time of this writing), the
government was in discussions with the IMF regarding the second
disbursement of the loan, which was
delayed due to the government's inability to meet the tax-related conditions
demanded by the IMF.
More significant than the recent IMF measures is the
general decline in confidencepessimism
regarding in the country’s the
country’s economic and political future among the professional and
capitalist middle class. A
large volume of capital has left the country, including through liquidation of
foreign currency accounts at a government-imposed
exchange rate that was much lower
than market exchange rates,
reinforcing fixed by the government [[how can “market” rates be “fixed” ??], because people fears
that conditions are destined to worsen further. Figures for capital outflows
are difficult to obtain; however, anecdotal evidence from bankers in the United
Arab Emirates an immediate increase in new bank accounts being opened by
Pakistani investors immediately following Pakistan’s nuclear tests. The
domestic stock market has suffered a sharp downturn during the past several
years. Property values across the country have also declined, betraying a general
lack of confidence in its political and economic future. Industrial production
is sagging because of lack of new investment as well as energy shortages
stemming from distribution losses and theft of electric power. New power
generation from the IPP’s was curtailed because of the ongoing corruption cases
against them, and the much sought after gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan into Pakistan is no longer likely in the near-term, following the
U.S. oil firm UNOCAL’s decision to terminate its pipeline project after USU.S.
missile strikes on suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan in August 1998. Many young, educated professionals are seeking
immigration and employment opportunities abroad because the immediate and
future prospects at home are so limited. For lower and middle class Pakistanis,
leaving the country is not an option; the immediate and growing concern for
them is coping with the pressure of rising prices and declining incomes.
At the same time asSurprisingly
perhaps, amid this sense of general despair at the country’s short- and
medium-term prospects, surprisingly
there is bustling commercial activity in urban centers is
bustling. The money for this activity is generated from a variety of
sources. Part of it is legitimate from continuing agricultural and industrial
production. However, a growing portion is also generated from illegal
activities, such as drug smuggling from
Afghanistan and Pakistan, smuggling of consumer items, kickbacks for lucrative
deals, and unpaid bank loans. Notwithstanding the informal economy, by August
clear signs of an economic slowdown amid lining purchasing power in the major
cities was evident.
Pakistan’s
declining economic conditions will have detrimental political effects. First, urban
unemployment is likely to increase as a result of with
shrinking domestic and foreign investment, capital and
professional flight from the country, continuing inflation, energy shortages
leading to lower productivity, and reduced public expenditure on development, urban unemployment is likely to grow.
Poor economic conditions in cities, compounded by continuing rural-urban
migration, will undoubtedly heighten the ethnic and sectarian sources of
dissatisfaction and fuel support for extremist political elements. Second, as
the legitimate economy shrinks – —because
of lack of capital due to declining investment, low creditworthiness, and the
loss of external markets - —the
illegal economy is expanding. This is already having
generating severe social consequences in Pakistan and the region, in the
form of drugs and weapons proliferation, which
are is likely
to worsen. Third, the country is suffering an ever greater brain
drain with as
more and more increasing
numbers of young, young, educated professionals seeking work opportunities abroad and
fewer educated Pakistanis plan to return home,
the country will suffer an even greater brain drain than before.
Pakistan’s
history of antagonism with its larger neighbor,
India, has made it
all the more important for it to build strong alliances with other
countries in the region all the more important. These alliances
provide Pakistan with political guarantees and an economic space. In the
1970’s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto forged closer ties with the Muslim world and China, in order to counter perceived Indian
aggression and influence in
the region. In the 1990’s, these alliances have suffered badly in
large measure because of Pakistan’s single-minded pursuit of installing a
regime in Afghanistan that is closely aligned with its interests. Its relations
with India have continued to be poor, which have led Pakistan down a
distressing path of testing its nuclear weapons capability in response to
Indian tests in 1998. Pakistan's entry into the nuclear club, far from bestowing
it with international respect, has made it appear as a pariah state.
Many observers [[dare I suggest cites when I change
the language in this way?]]view Pakistan's Its
military foray into Indian Kashmir
in summer 1999ashas further evidence strengthened the arguments of its political
detractors abroad-the most important of which is India-that
Pakistan that the
country has earned the The label, “ of rogue state,” has a “rogue army” that supports terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism and is with
armed with a dangerous
nuclear weapons capacity.
has increasingly stuck with
Pakistan's military foray into Indian Kashmir in the summer of 1999.
With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent decline in American support for Pakistan
and the Afghan opposition forces, a new proxy war between Pakistan and Iran
emerged in Afghanistan. Regional rivalry quickly took the place of superpower
competition in Afghanistan: Iran seeks an Afghan government that would include
Shi'a and Tajik elements and at minimum would not be against its interests;
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia seek to install a Pashtun and Sunni dominated regime.
The emergence and rapid military successes of the Taliban - —a
radical Sunni, Pashtun-based movement - —which
emerged in 1994 and was supported first by the Benazir Bhutto government and
the Pakistani ISI, with Saudi financial support, sharpened the Iran-Pakistan
confrontation. Islamabad’s continuing support for the Taliban as they have
swept across Afghanistan has further deteriorated relations with Iran. It has
also adversely affected Pakistan's relations with several Central Asian states,
whose markets and energy reserves Pakistan desires to access, as well as Russia
and China, all of whom fear for their own reasons a Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s erstwhile patron, the USU.S.,
which had been cooling off its support because Pakistan was no longer an
important geo-political player, pulled away further in 1998 primarily because
of the Taliban’s provision of safe haven for its most wanted terrorist, Osama
bin Laden.
In May 1999, the Pakistani army embarked on a new
adventure in Kashmir by dispatching hundreds of regular soldiers and a number
of Islamic militants to capture some strategic heights inside Indian territory.
While the Pakistani government repeatedly claimed that this was an internal
uprising of Kashmiri "mujahideen",
or freedom fighters, sufficient evidence of the army's direct involvement
became available almost from the beginning. With little strategic purpose
besides inflicting damage on Indian forces and heightening international
attention to the Kashmir cause, the Kargil episode resulted instead in global
condemnation of Pakistan's actions. International pressures, including from the
U.S. directly on Sharif during his visit with President Clinton in
Washington,DC on July 4 1999, ultimately resulted in Pakistan's ignominious
withdrawal from Indian Kashmir several weeks after it launched its incursion.
The Kargil May–July
1999 Kashmir fiasco,besides further alienating Pakistan
internationally, demonstrated several bitter truisms. First, there exist important elements within
the military establishment that
are staunchly against any rapproachement with India. The fact that
the Kargil episode occurred so soon after Vajpayee's famous bus ride from Delhi
to Lahore in February 1999, reversing those tentative diplomatic gains,
signified the military's continuing penchant for hostility with India. Second,
the military continues to act independently of the civilian government,
notwithstanding Sharif's recent efforts to develop a closer symbiotic
relationship with the army. Third, the military has courted and
fought alongside non-state militias from radical sectarian groups in the
country, a fact that suggests that important elements within the army are
sympathetic to their agenda.
While many of the deep-seated problems of the country are not solely of its making, the Sharif government’s actions have exacerbated political divisions, weakened civilian institutions, and deepened the economic malaise in Pakistan since 1997. The principal responsibility of turning away from the present political and economic precipice rests with the government. A serious commitment to reversing this disastrous course will require a series of changes in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies.
In the short-term, the government must reopen a process of meaningful dialogue with the other political parties that are represented in Parliament at both federal and provincial levels. It must also restore and strengthen civilian institutions, refrain from using the military to maintain internal security and run civil affairs, and stop the harassment of the press.
The
principle of the will of the majority is sacrosanct when two conditions are
met. First, there must be a broad consensus regarding the acceptability of the
democratic system itself. Second, key institutions such as the judiciary must
be strong and independent, so that they can check and balance the power of the
executive. In part because of Sharif’s actions since 1997, both these
conditions are threatened. The parliamentary opposition has become increasingly
alienated. It has little stake in the parliamentary system now, in part because
the chances of a democratic change in its favor are distant, but also because
the government has used its majority to totally sideline the other parties
rather than to building
coalitions. The judiciary, which was always politicized and corrupt because of
the habits of all previous regimes, has been further weakened by the
introduction of military courts, Special Courts established by the
Anti-Terrorism Act, and the Ehtesabehtesabbureau established by the
executive. These institutions, while effective in the short-term in punishing
the misdeeds of Sharif’s political opponents, are anything but impartial.
The
desire for ethnic-based autonomy among many groups in Pakistan itself indicates
the failure of nation building. Non-Punjabi populations have consistently been
excluded from institutions of power and patronage, such as the military and
bureaucracy. Now, the wholesale suppression of all
opposition demands is leading to worsening fears among minority
groups of ethnic hegemony by a government that is heavily dominated by Punjabi
elites. Moderate elements of the opposition parties, many of whom are currently
in the national and provincial parliaments, should be included in a genuine
parliamentary process,
where their representation on various committees can influence the course of
legislation and policy. In the long-term, the only solution to curbing
ethnic dissatisfaction is to accommodate the interests of the minority ethnic
groups in the institutions of political and economic power. This will require
representation in national institutions, such as the military, as well as a
greater devolution of political authority to the provincial and municipal
levels. The longer these issues are ignored, the more difficult likely it will be that radical demands will emerge at
a later stage.to accommodate [[“accommodate”?? Do you mean something like, “the more likely it will be that
radical demands will emerge at a later stage, and these demands will be more
difficult to accommodate” (not
brilliant draftsmanship)]] <